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Abstract
Nearly every country engaged in counterterrorism campaigns includes leadership
targeting as a key pillar of its counterterrorism strategy. However, the effectiveness of
leadership removal in reducing the lethality of terrorist organizations is fiercely debated in
the academic community. This thesis contributes to this field by examining how varying
levels of charismatic authority and institutionalization within a terrorist group interact to
impact the outcome of leadership removal on a terrorist organization’s operational
capacity. I find that leadership removal is rarely an effective military strategy for degrading
the operational capacity of a terrorist organization, working successfully only on terrorist
groups that are highly dependent on charismatic authority and have a weak institutional
structure. However, leadership removal, particularly within terrorist groups that have both
high levels of charismatic authority and institutionalization, causes political change within
terrorist groups that, depending on the internal dynamics of that group, can have either
positive or negative implications for counterterrorism policy.
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Introduction
In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush called on
the Taliban government in Afghanistan to hand over the leadership of Al Qaeda and
promised the American people that the United States would hunt down the leaders of Al
Qaeda wherever they might be.1 In 2008, Barrack Obama made the finding and killing or
capturing of Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, a key campaign pledge that he
fulfilled in 2010.2 In 2016, presidential candidate Hillary Clinton promised that, if elected,
she would find and kill the leaders of ISIS.3 This emphasis on targeting terrorist leaders as a
way of combating terrorism has been at the forefront of the United States’
counterterrorism policy for the last twenty years.
Targeting terrorist leaders is not only a US counterterrorism response but also a
global reaction by states to terrorism. After the Moscow apartment building bombings,
Russian President Vladimir Putin promised to have the leaders of the Chechen terrorist
organization responsible “rubbed out, even if they’re on the outhouse.”4 Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explicitly warned terrorist organizations that if Israel was
attacked, they would respond by hunting down and removing the leaders of those
George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on 9-11-01” American Rhetoric.
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911addresstothenation.htm
2 Barrack Obama, Second Presidential Debate, Oct. 7th, 2008.
3 Spencer Ackerman, “Hillary Clinton’s plan to stop Isis: hunt down leader Abu Bakr alBaghdadi,” The Guardian. September 23rd, 2016.
4 Owen Matthews, “Why Russia’s Reaction to Terrorism is All About Strengthening Putin’s
Power.” Newsweek, April 10th, 2017.
1
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organizations responsible.5 Across the globe, despite differences in regimes and governing
philosophies, states that are the victims of terrorist attacks make leadership removal a key
counterterrorism policy. The default global response to terrorism is leadership removal.
The logic underlying leadership removal is: If the head of a terrorist organization is
eliminated then that organization will be significantly less capable of planning and
executing lethal terrorist attacks. However, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of
targeting terrorist organizations’ leaders is mixed, providing unclear guidance for
policymakers.
The school of thought that supports leadership removal as a counterterrorism
strategy argues that a terrorist organization’s unique reliance on charismatic authority
makes it particularly vulnerable to leadership removal.6 This argument claims that
terrorist organizations must rely on charismatic authority to hold their organization
together and, since charismatic authority is not easily replaced, leadership removal
presents an existential crisis for terrorist organizations because it challenges their
legitimacy in the eyes of their followers. This argument is heavily criticized by scholars who
oppose the use of leadership removal as a counterterrorism strategy for overstating the
importance of charismatic authority within terrorist organizations.

Toi Staff, “Netanyahu warns terror groups: Don’t even think about it,” The Times of Israel.
November 12th, 2017.
6 See Bryan Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2012, 946, and David Hofmann, “The Influence of Charismatic Authority on Operational Strategies
and Attack Outcomes of Terrorist Groups,” Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016,
14-44.
5
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Scholars who oppose the use of leadership removal as a counterterrorism strategy
tend to substantiate their arguments through the ideas of organizational resilience.7 These
arguments claim that terrorist organizations are not all that different from other
organizations that employ political violence. Terrorist groups, and in particular large and
established terrorist groups, will have complicated institutional structures that allow them
to easily replace lost leaders and have their overall operational capacity unaffected by
leadership removal.
The theories that focus on the importance of charismatic authority and those that
focus on institutionalization in a terrorist group are often viewed as mutually exclusive.
Terrorist groups are either secretive organizations that are entirely dependent on
charismatic authority to bind them together or they are well-structured and heavily
institutionalized organizations ,where leaders are little more than transactional pieces of a
greater machine. This thesis, however, argues that notions of charismatic authority and
institutionalization are not mutually exclusive within terrorist groups. Instead, terrorist
groups contain varying levels of charismatic authority and institutionalization and this
influences how they respond to leadership removal.
The goal of this thesis is to provide a greater understanding into how the variables
of charismatic authority and institutionalization interact within a terrorist group to
influence the effects of leadership removal. To do this, this thesis examines terrorist
organizations with varying levels of dependency on charismatic authority and
See Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark,” International Security, Vol. 38,
No. 4, 2014, 7-38, and Lisa Langdon, Alexander J. Sarapu, and Matthew Wells, “Targeting
the Leadership of Terrorist and Insurgent Movements: Historical Lessons for
Contemporary Policy Makers,” Journal of Public and International Affairs. Vol. 15 2004, 5978.
7
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institutionalization and shows how these two variables determine if the operational
capacity of a terrorist organization is harmed by leadership removal.
In this thesis, I argue that leadership removal is rarely an effective way to degrade
the operational capacity of terrorist groups. Leadership removal is remarkably ineffective
at reducing a terrorist group’s underlining operational capacity, working only in terrorist
organizations that are heavily reliant on charismatic authority with a weak institutional
structure. Instead, the greatest impacts of leadership removal are political. The loss of a
leader forces political change within a terrorist group and the results of this political
change can have either positive or negative counterterrorism policy implications based on
the internal dynamics of the terrorist group.
Chapter I of this thesis focuses on the theoretical background and reviews the
literature on leadership removal. In this chapter, I explain the competing theories on
terrorist group organization, and I explore the arguments made by major authors in the
fields and their critiques of each other’s work.
Chapter 2 outlines the methods and research design of this thesis. In this section, I
explain and justify the cases selected in this thesis, define relevant terms, layout the key
variables used in this thesis, and show how those variables are measured.
Chapter 3 examines the effects of leadership removal on the operational capacity of
Aum Shinrikyo. Aum Shinrikyo was a large Japanese terrorist organization that was highly
dependent on the charismatic authority of its leader, Shoko Asahara, and lacked a strong
institutional structure. It was also notable for being the only terrorist organization to use
weapons of mass destruction. I find that, in line with the theoretical understanding,

4

leadership removal decimated the operational capacity of Aum Shinrikyo and quickly led to
organizational collapse.
Chapter 4 examines the effects of leadership removal on the operational capacity of
Hamas. Hamas is a large terrorist organization that is not highly dependent on charismatic
authority, but is incredibly institutionalized and well-structured. It operates in Israel, the
West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Here, again, I find that the impact of leadership removal
follows the theoretical arguments. The loss of its leaders did not negatively impact the
operational capacity of Hamas and ultimately ended up strengthening its position.
Chapter 5 examines the impact of leadership removal on the PKK. The PKK is a
Kurdish insurgent organization that engages in terrorist attacks to further its political goal
of creating a Kurdish state. The organization at the time of leadership removal was both
highly dependent on the charismatic authority of its leader and incredibly institutionalized
and well-structured. In this case, I find that while leadership removal did not reduce the
underlying operational capacity of the PKK, it did force political changes within the group
that led to positive counterterrorism policy developments.
Chapter 6 examines the case of leadership removal in Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is a large
transnational terrorist organization that, like the PKK, was heavily reliant on the
charismatic authority of its leader, Osama Bin Laden, while also having a sophisticated
institutional structure to support the organization. Again, I find that leadership removal did
not reduce the operational capacity of Al Qaeda, but did force political change within the
organization. However, unlike the PKK, this political change did not lead to a decrease in
the lethality of Al Qaeda, but instead made the organization more violent and more
regionally focused.

5

The last section of this thesis is the conclusion. Here I claim that leadership removal
needs to be reevaluated and used not as a military tool to degrade the operational capacity
of terrorist organizations, but rather as a political strategy to modify terrorist
organizations. I also lay out other areas for further research.
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Chapter I
The Theory of Leadership Removal
The efficacy of leadership removal on a terrorist organization’s operational capacity
is a contentious subject. Governments and military officials tend to be ardent supporters of
leadership targeting. Meanwhile, academics have tended to be more critical of the efficacy
of leadership removal as a means of degrading terrorist organizations. Each side has
developed its own theoretical framework to support its case. These theories are heavily
focused on organizational structure, borrowing from the fields of economics and sociology.
Supporters of leadership removal tend to draw heavily from theories on charismatic
authority, while detractors draw from theories of organizational resilience.
The foundational puzzle for both the supporters and detractors of leadership
targeting is, why do leaders matter? Practically every government in conflict with terrorist
groups pursues leadership targeting as a counterterrorism strategy. However,
governments typically don’t apply leadership targeting as a strategy when in conflict with
another state. What makes the leaders of terrorist organizations different?

Charismatic Leadership Theory
Supporters of leadership targeting argue that terrorist organizations’ structures
leave them uniquely vulnerable to the death or capture of their leaders. Terrorist
organizations are in asymmetric power arrangements, in which the states that they are

7

fighting have significantly more capacity than they do. To compensate for their lack of
power, terrorist organizations are secretive and opaque.8 They blend in with the general
population, making it harder for the state security apparatus to determine who is a
member of a terrorist organization and who is a citizen.9 While this structure helps
terrorist organizations adapt to the asymmetry of power, it also restricts how terrorist
organizations can be structured.
In his groundbreaking work on leadership structures, Max Weber argued that there
are three types of authority around which to structure an organization: tradition,
rational/legal, and charismatic.10 In order for an organization to be successful in mobilizing
individuals to complete its goals, one of these types of authority needs to be present.
An organization possesses traditional authority when it is based on long standing
traditions, norms, and cultural customs. The classic example of an organization structured
around traditional authority is the English monarchy. The English monarchy is incredibly
old, steeped in tradition, and has been an essential part of the English culture. All of these
factors allow the English monarchy to be a source of traditional authority to this day.
Terrorist organizations, on the other hand, typically lack the factors necessary to
create strong traditional authority within their organization. While terrorist organizations
are not a new phenomenon, individual terrorist organizations typically don’t last longer
than a century, making it hard for them to have the background to establish strong
traditional authority.11 Additionally, while norms and cultural customs certainly exist
Bryan Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2012, 18-19.
Ibid, 18-19
10 Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, S.N. Eisenstadt, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1968, 48.
11 Bryan Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 14-17.
8
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within terrorist organizations, they are weaker than the norms and cultural customs found
within organizations with the capacity to engage in state building.12 The nature of terrorist
organizations makes them weak sources of traditional authority.
The most common type of authority in organizations is rational/legal. Rational/legal
authority is derived through an agreed process through which laws are created and
enforced.13 Thinking back to the Great Britain example, an organization in that country
with rational/legal authority would be parliament and the police force. Parliament is how
the sovereign people of Great Britain agreed that they would be governed, which in turns
makes legitimate coercive use of force by the police to uphold the law.
Terrorist organizations also typically lack strong rational/legal authority. The two
key pillars that uphold rational/legal authority are legitimate rules and enforceability.14
Terrorist organizations are weak in both pillars. For rules to be legitimate, they have to be
created in a standardized and agreed upon way. This is difficult for terrorist organizations
because, in order to conduct their organizations activities in secret from the states that are
trying to dismantle them, they lack high levels of institutionalization.15 This makes them
different from organizations with strong rational/legal authority, all of which have high
level of institutionalization that provides them with authority.16 Terrorist organizations
also lack strong enforcement powers. Terrorist organizations lack the capacity of states,
which means their ability to assert their authority over individuals is much less than that of
David Hofmann, “The Influence of Charismatic Authority on Operational Strategies and
Attack Outcomes of Terrorist Groups,” Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016, 1421.
13 Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building. 1968.
14 Ibid, 1968.
15 Bryan Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists” 16.
16 Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, 1968.
12
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state organizations.17 Overall, terrorist organizations lack the foundation for obtaining
strong rational/legal authority.
The weakness of terrorist organizations to build traditional or rational/legal
authority leaves them with only charismatic authority around which to build their
organization. The key factor for an organization that is built around charismatic authority
is its leader. A leader who has charismatic authority is considered to be superior to an
ordinary man by the followers of the leader.18 Followers are willing to commit themselves
to that leader and all followers feel a deep personal connection to their leader, even if they
have never met before.19 While this type of authority has the least structure to it, it is
considered the most powerful in its ability to mobilize people.
Terrorist organizations rely heavily on charismatic authority. The ability to mobilize
individuals without a concrete organizational structure is appealing to terrorist groups
because it allows them to recruit members without the risk of exposing the organization.
Devotion to a charismatic leader also helps overcome collective action problems. The risks
involved with joining a terrorist organization are much higher than the potential rewards.
This poses a major problem for terrorist recruitment, but charismatic authority overcomes
this problem by changing the framework through which an individual evaluates his/her
self-interest.20 Followers of charismatic leaders define their self-interest as the interests of
the leader or the leader’s vision.21 This makes many actions that appear irrational to
Bryan Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists” 16-17.
David Hofmann, “The Influence of Charismatic Authority on Operational Strategies and
Attack Outcomes of Terrorist Groups.” Journal of Strategic Security. Vol. 9, No. 2. 2016, 20.
19 Ibid, 20.
20 Ibid, 20.
21 David Hofmann, “The Influence of Charismatic Authority on Operational Strategies and
Attack Outcomes of Terrorist Groups.” 20.
17
18
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outside observers, such as suicide bombings, rational to individuals under charismatic
authority. This is why so many of the most lethal and effective terrorist organizations in
history have been headed by charismatic leaders such as Osama Bin Laden, Shoko Asahara,
Abimael Guzman, and Abdullah Öcalan.
Scholars who support leadership targeting argue that terrorist organizations’ heavy
reliance on charismatic authority makes them ideal for leadership targeting programs.
There are two types of leaders, transactional and charismatic.22 Transactional leaders are
focused on managing an organization. They set goals for individuals and set benchmarks
for the organization to hit.23 This makes them easily replaceable since the skills of setting
goals and benchmarks are not exactly unique. Charismatic leaders, on the other hand, have
to have all the previously mentioned skills necessary to create charismatic authority. This
type of leader cannot simply be replaced. The ability to get others to commit themselves
fully to a leader and their cause is not common, and members of organizations built behind
a charismatic leader often consider themselves committed to the leader, not the
organization.24 Thus, the removal of a charismatic leader from an organization built around
charismatic authority should quickly cause that organization to collapse.
Charismatic leader theorists have tried to support their work empirically. Bryan
Price, one of the strongest advocates for the use of leadership removal as a
counterterrorism strategy, conducted a quantitative study looking at hundreds of cases of
leadership removal through a database he designed himself. He found that while violence
would typically spike after a terrorist organization suffered leadership removal, the
Bryan Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 20-21.
Ibid, 20
24 Ibid, 21
22
23
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duration of the organization’s life span would be significantly shortened by leadership
removal.25 Terrorist organizations, Price concludes, are simply unable to replace their
leaders, which causes their organizations to fall apart.
These results were closely corroborated by the results of Patrick Johnston. He found
that successful counterterrorism campaigns almost always had instances of leadership
removal, leadership removal would lead to an overall decrease in violence committed by a
terrorist organization, and leadership removal would shorten the length of
counterterrorism operations.26 This is similar to the results of a study by Jason Brown, who
found that the removal of Al Qaeda leaders significantly reduced that organization’s
operational capacity.27
For supporters of using leadership removal as a counterterrorism strategy, it is
clear that terrorist organizations are overly reliant on their leaders. The best way to
counter terrorist organizations is to remove its leaders, as the organization will be unable
to find a replacement and find its organizational lifespan and operational capacity reduced.
Critiques of Charismatic Leadership Theory
There are several critiques leveled at the charismatic leader theory on both an
empirical and theoretical level. First, there are some problems with the empirical work
supporting the theory. There is a real difficulty in establishing causality between leadership
removal and reductions in a terrorist organization’s operational capacity. Max Abrahms
notes that leadership removal almost never takes place in a vacuum. It is almost always
Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists” 43-44.
Patrick Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership
Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International Security, Vol 36, No 4., 2012, 4779
27 Jason Brown, “To Bomb or Not to Bomb? Counterinsurgency, Airpower, and Dynamic
Targeting,” Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2007 75-86.
25
26
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accompanied by a sustained counterterrorism campaign that engages the terrorist
organization at all levels and by intelligence operations conducted by states that make it
harder for terrorist organizations to plan and execute lethal terrorist attacks.28 Given the
multi-faceted nature of counterterrorism campaigns, it is difficult to assess the success of
just one strategy. This is why Patrick Johnston does not claim causality in his study, but
rather just makes note of the strong correlation between leadership removal and the
reduction of terrorist violence.29
Bryan Price does try to establish causality between leadership removal and
organizational death, but in doing so, he creates some problematic issues. In order to
obtain statistically significant results, Price created a huge sample across which he could
measure the effectiveness of leadership removal. However, to make his sample large
enough to be statistically significant, he included many terrorist organizations that had
fewer than 100 members in them when they experienced leadership removal.30 An
organization with fewer than 100 members would receive a greater than 1% reduction in
overall capacity from leadership removal, so it is difficult to establish whether the
organizational death that occurred afterwards was a result of the loss of a charismatic
leader or the overall reduction in capacity of the terrorist organization.
Finally, critics argue that charismatic leadership theorists are wrong in their
assumptions about how common and important charismatic leaders are in terrorist
organizations. While supporters of charismatic leadership theory argue that terrorist
organizations rely on charismatic instead of transactional leaders to preserve their secrecy,
Max Abrahms and Jochen Mierau, “Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killing on
Militant Group Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol. 29 No. 5 2017, 47-79
29 Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work?” 47.
30 Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists” 34.
28
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critics respond with empirical cases that show transactional leadership is actually quite
common within terrorist organizations.
For example, when the United States assassinated Osama Bin Laden, they uncovered
thousands of internal Al Qaeda documents that detailed an intricate financial system that
illustrated that Al Qaeda had a very hierarchical and structured center.31 There were
clearly identifiable, mid-level transactional leaders and there were clear lines of succession.
All this suggested that Al Qaeda was not overly dependent on the charismatic authority of
Osama Bin Laden to maintain its operational capacity. Additionally, some terrorist
organizations, such as the IRA and Hamas, function as violent wings of political parties. Not
only do these organizations boast many lower and mid-level transactional leaders that help
run the organizations, but the authority within these organizations is derived not from the
charisma of its leaders, but from strength of the political party’s ideology. This suggests
that even if a leader of one of these organizations is removed, the ideological authority of
the organization will survive. With these points, critics contend that the charismatic
leadership theory’s assumptions are fatally flawed and an alternative outlook on leadership
removal is needed.

Organizational Resilience Theory
Scholars critical of the charismatic leadership theory and the effectiveness of
leadership removal at reducing the operational capacity of terrorist organizations use
organizational resilience theory to argue that terrorist organizations can easily absorb the
loss of leader without suffering a blow to that organization’s operational capacity. The
organizational resilience theory takes the key assumption behind the charismatic
Jacob Shapiro The Terrorist Dilemma: managing violent covert organizations. (Princeton
University Press 2013) 83-99.
31
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leadership theory - that leaders are critically important to a terrorist organization’s
authority - and directly contradicts it, arguing that individual leaders are not important to
the functioning of a terrorist organization.
Organizational resilience theory argues that the level of institutionalization present
within an organization, as opposed to its leaders, is what determines the ability of an
organization to function effectively. Institutionalization strengthens organizations through
several channels. First, the more institutionalized an organization, the more diverse its
resources will be.32 As an organization becomes more bureaucratic, specialized branches
carry out specific tasks. In a terrorist organization, this might look like having a branch of
the organization that is dedicated to bomb making, which is separate from the group’s
finance branch. A more bureaucratic organization is also more likely to have redundancies
built into the organization, such as having multiple sources financing, which make the
organization more durable.
More institutionalized and bureaucratized organizations will also be more resistant
to outside shocks because of their clearly defined rules, procedures, and lines of succession.
With an established process to follow, institutionalized organizations can prevent the
damaging confusion that follows a disruption to the organization and quickly continue to
carry out its objectives.33 A leader that is removed from an institutionalized organization
will quickly be replaced without a leadership struggle that is damaging to the organization.
The effectiveness of the organizational resilience theory is easily seen in the most
institutionalized and bureaucratic institutions that are dedicated to the use of violence,
Jenna Jordan “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark,” International Security, Vol. 38, No.
4, 2014, 11-12.
33 Ibid, 13-15.
32
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namely military units. Military units routinely suffer leadership removal, yet they have a
tendency to handle leadership removal very well. For example, the average battle casualty
rate for 1st Lieutenants in the U.S. Army during the Second World War was 105%.34 This
meant the average company, a military unit of around 200 soldiers, would experience one
instance of leadership removal over the course of the war. The battle casualty rate for 2nd
Lieutenants was nearly twice as high at 204%.35 Yet despite the frequency of leadership
removal within military units in WWII, the United States Army did not lose operational
capacity and continued on to win the war.
Even total devastation of the leadership in military units does not have to lead to
organizational collapse. When the 116th Infantry regiment landed on Omaha Beach, all of its
officers, including its commanding officer, were killed or wounded within the first hour of
combat.36 Yet despite this tremendous loss of leadership, the 116th Infantry regiment went
on to secure the Omaha beachhead within 24-hours and continued to serve as an effective
frontline force throughout the French campaign.37 Clearly ,the loss of leadership does not
prevent military organizations from accomplishing strategic objectives.
Empirical research also suggests that terrorist organizations also have enough of an
institutional structure to resist the effects of leadership removal. Jenna Jordan has, one of
the most detailed studies on leadership removal. She examined hundreds of cases of
terrorist removal and she found that, on average, leadership removal tends to be
Anne Leland and Mari-Jana, “American War and Military Operations Casualties: List and
Statistics.” Congressional Research Service. February 26th, 2010.
35 Leland and Jana, “American War and Military Operations Casualties: List and Statistics,”
2010.
36 Austin Long, “Whack-a-mole or Coup de Grace? Institutionalization and Leadership
Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Security Studies. Vol. 23, 2014, 477.
37Ibid, 477.
34
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counterproductive, as it will actually increase levels of violence.38 This trend was
particularly pronounced among the older, larger, and most institutionalized terrorist
organizations. This led Jenna Jordan to conclude that leadership removal is a costly and
counterproductive counterterrorism strategy.39
Multiple scholars have replicated these results. Aaron Mannes and Lisa Landon both
conducted large quantitative studies that also found leadership removal to have a
negligible impact on terrorist organizations.40 These results also held up in case studies.
Steven David found, when he examined the unnamed but widely acknowledged program by
Israel of target killing, that it did not deter terrorist organizations.41 In fact, he found many
instances in which targeted killing actually led to an increase in the lethality of the terrorist
organization.42 The organizations that he was examining were all firmly established with a
great degree of institutionalization. This gave the organizations the capacity to step up
attacks, even while Israel targeted their leaders.
In the face of an institutionalized terrorist organization, supporters of the
organizational resilience theory find that leadership removal is simply ineffective at
impairing the operational capacity of the terrorist organization. Through this perspective,

Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,”
Security Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2009, 719-755
39ibid, 719-720.
40 Aaron Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders
Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?” Journal of International Policy Solutions, Vol. 9. 2008,
40-49 and Lisa Langdon, Alexander J. Sarapu and Matthew Wells, “Targeting the Leadership
of Terrorist and Insurgent Movements: Historical Lessons for Contemporary Policy
Makers,” Journal of Public and International Affairs. Vol. 15 2004, 59-78.
41 Steven David, “Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,” The Review of
International Affairs, Vol. 2, No 3. 2003, 138-158.
42 Ibid, 138.
38
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leadership targeting is at best ineffective, and at worst counterproductive to
counterterrorism goals.
Critiques of Organizational Resilience Theory
There are several critiques of the organizational resilience theory. A large problem
with the theory for its detractors is that it treats leaders as actors with no real agency or
influence in their organization. The organizational resilience theory treats leaders as little
more than replaceable parts. Empirically, this is not always the case. When Israel
implemented its leadership-targeting program, it quickly brought Hamas to the negotiating
table, and the first demand of Hamas was to stop the leadership-targeting program.43
Clearly, the leaders of Hamas changed the operational strategy of their organization to
adapt to the threat to their leadership. This is an outcome that the organizational resilience
theory fails to explain.
Organizational resilience theory, just like the charismatic leadership theory, also has
measurement issues. While levels of institutionalization are certainly easier to measure,
through the presence of captured financial and bureaucratic documents and information
received through interrogations, than charisma, measurements of institutionalization are
often based on faulty assumptions. For example, it is generally assumed that old and large
terrorist organizations have to be highly bureaucratic, otherwise they would not have
survived so long.44 Again, this is not always the case. The Shining Path in Peru had
thousands of members and was active in Peru for over 30 years, yet had low levels of

43
44

Steven David, “Fatal Choices” 143-144.
Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark.” 14.
18

institutionalization around its central leadership.45 Classifying the level of
institutionalization of a terrorist organization based on age and size alone can lead to faulty
results.
The portrayal of terrorist organizations as either organizations dependent on
charismatic authority or organizational resilience in their structure is detrimental to
evaluating the effectiveness of leadership removal. Terrorist organizations are not
uniformly organized. Almost all terrorist organizations contain both charismatic leaders
and institutional structures designed to increase the ability of that organization to
withstand counterterrorism operations, but the importance and structure of these two
variables will vary across terrorist organizations. This means from a theoretical
perspective that evaluating the effectiveness of leadership removal should not be explained
as a binary choice, in which organizations that are based on charismatic authority will be
greatly affected by leadership removal and organizations with high levels of
institutionalization will not be significantly affected. Rather, the effectiveness of leadership
removal on a terrorist organization is determined by how these two variables interact with
each other.
The interaction of these two variables can be seen in the case of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda
had an incredibly charismatic leader in Osama Bin Laden. He could expertly articulate the
vision of the organization and he had a large impact on the members of Al Qaeda, even if he
had never personally interacted with them.46 At the same time though, Al Qaeda is a very
institutionalized group at its core. Captured documents reveal that Al Qaeda kept detailed
Steven Stern, Shining and Other Paths War and Society in Peru 1980-1995. (Duke
University Press 1998), 267-301.
46 Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists” 45.
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financial records that included a payroll system, and also collected demographic
information on its recruits, and would even provide social services and benefits to the
families of it recruits.47 The existence of both charismatic authority and high levels of
institutionalization in one terrorist organization challenges the classical theoretical
understanding of leadership removal.
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Chapter II
Methods and Research Design
In order to determine how charismatic authority and institutionalization interact
within a terrorist organization to impact the effectiveness of leadership removal, this thesis
is constructed as a typology. I examine leadership removal in four terrorist organizations,
Aum Shinrikyo, Hamas, the PKK, and Al Qaeda.
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These four terrorist groups provide valuable case studies through which I examine
how charismatic authority and institutionalization interact within a terrorist organization.
The cases of Aum Shinrikyo and Hamas were chosen to test the traditional theoretical
thought on leadership removal. As an organization with high charismatic authority and low
levels of institutionalization, Aum Shinrikyo should be severely degraded by leadership
removal. Hamas, on the other hand, as an organization with low levels of charismatic
authority but high levels of institutionalization, should prove resilient to leadership
removal. The cases of Al Qaeda and the PKK are the most important to this thesis, as they
shed the most light on how charismatic authority and institutionalization influence the
effects of leadership removal. In these organizations, the two classical theoretical
frameworks reach opposite conclusions about what the effects of leadership removal
would be. Since there is a high amount of charismatic authority within Al Qaeda and the
PKK, charismatic leadership theory would suggest leadership removal would be effective at
reducing the operational capacity of terrorist organizations, whereas since both
organizations also have high levels of institutionalization, organizational resilience theory
would suggest that their operational capacity would not be hindered by leadership
removal.
I have not included any organizations with both low levels of charismatic authority
and institutionalization because they are extremely rare. While terrorist organizations can
have both high levels of charismatic authority and institutionalization, they generally need
at least one of them to function. An organization without a consolidated charismatic
authority or a strong institutional structure would have no way to bind its members
together and exert authority over them. Even if a terrorist organization managed to
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function in a low institutionalization and charismatic authority setting, choosing to
examine it to learn about the effects of leadership removal on a terrorist organization’s
operational capacity would be pointless since leaders in that group would not be important
to the organization’s functions.
One final important note about the terrorist organizations examined in this thesis is
they are all large organizations. Each one of these organizations had, at the peak of its
power, over 10,000 members. I chose to examine large organizations for three reasons.
First, size is an important factor in determining the risk posed by a terrorist organization.
While smaller groups can certainly cause havoc and conduct devastating attacks, larger
group will pose more of a threat to a state due to the increase capacity that comes with a
larger number of individuals. This makes the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of
leadership removal on the operational capacity of terrorist organizations more valuable in
since governments and citizens have more to fear from large terrorist organizations.
Secondly, the inclusion of large terrorist groups allows this thesis to measure how
organizational resilience theory and charismatic leadership theory interact within an
organization. As previously mentioned, terrorist organizations typically have both
significant levels of institutionalization and a charismatic leader and one of the goals of this
thesis is to determine how these two factors interact within an organization. However,
smaller terrorist organizations can lack the high levels of institutionalization on which
organizational resilience theory is based. For example, Louis Beam, the somewhat
charismatic head of a small far-right white supremacy group within the United States, has
no institutional structure to his organization. Instead, he tries to use charismatic appeals to
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get others to conduct violence in the name of his goals.48 While his case is somewhat
unique, his location, unlike that of most self-anointed leaders of terrorist groups, is known
to the authorities of the state that he is trying to undermine through terrorism. This
illustrates the point that smaller terrorist organizations don’t need, and won’t always have
,an institutional structure. While large terrorist organizations can also have lower levels of
institutionalization - the Shining Path, for example, has low levels of institutionalization,
albeit in the center, with the outer fringes of the organization being much more structured
– large organizations with to over 10,000 members require some sort of functioning
bureaucracy so the two variables will always interact.49 Studying the effects of leadership
removal on small terrorist organizations does not yield as many interesting insights, as
both charismatic leadership and organization resilience theorist would agree that
leadership removal in the case of these organizations would lead to organizational death.50
Finally, this thesis looks only at large terrorist organizations to help isolate the
effectiveness of leadership removal. There are many quantitative studies that find that
leadership removal is a particularly effective strategy against smaller terrorist
organizations. Even Jenna Jordan, an avowed critic of the strategy, notes in her quantitative
work that leadership removal is remarkably effective against small and newly established
terrorist organizations.51 However, many of the organizations that these quantitative
studies find leadership removal to be effective against are so small that it is hard to
attribute the aftermath of leadership removal simply to the loss of leadership. As
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mentioned earlier, many of these organizations have less than 100 members.52 In these
cases, the loss of a leader not only means the loss of a charismatic and guiding figure for the
organization but also the loss of over 1% of the organization’s manpower. In these cases, it
is exceptionally hard to use mathematical tools to isolate the effects of the loss of
leadership.

Determining Leaders
The prerequisite to studying the effects of leadership removal is determining who
the leaders of terrorist organizations are. Many studies in the field of leadership removal
use an expansive definition of leader that includes everything from operational
commanders to chief bomb makers. This thesis takes the opposite approach. In this thesis,
the leader of a terrorist organization is the head political authority within the organization.
Determining who the leader of the terrorist organizations in this thesis was quite easy.
They were all founders or co-founders of their respective organizations, held complete
authority within their organization, and were solely responsible for their organizations
overall agenda and strategy.

Defining Terms
Terrorist Organization: With acknowledgement to the fact that one person’s
terrorist is another’s freedom fighter, I have included these groups as terrorist
organizations based on the following definition of a terrorist organization: non-state
organizations that employ violence against civilians in pursuit of goals that are religious,
political, or ideological in nature. All of the previously mentioned groups, however laudable
one may consider their ultimate objectives to be, have undertaken actions that make them
See datasets in Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll” 143-145, and Price, “Targeting Top
Terrorists,” 34.
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fall into this category. All find themselves on the U.S. Department of State’s list of terrorist
organizations but their inclusion in this thesis is not an attempt to pass a moral judgment
on them, but an acknowledgement of their actions.53
Terrorist Attack: I define a terrorist attack as the use of violence by a terrorist
organization to further its political agenda. The parameters of this definition mean that
attacks undertaken by terrorist groups that target what under normal wartime
circumstances would be considered legitimate targets such as military units, are classified
as terrorist attacks. I am using this looser definition of a terrorist attack, as opposed to one
that only classifies attacks that directly target civilians as a terrorist attack because I feel
that this definition provides a better understanding of the operational capacity of a
terrorist organization.

Measuring Charismatic Authority Within an Organization
In order to determine how important charismatic authority was within a terrorist
group, I used David Hoffman fourteen-point measurement of charismatic authority.54 This
scale and the justifications for the leaders examined in this thesis can be viewed in the
Appendix, where I apply Hoffman’s scale to the leaders examined in this thesis.

Measuring Institutionalization
To determine levels of institutionalizations within terrorist organizations, I rely
heavily on the information from captured internal documents. These records do a good job
in explaining to what extent there was an organized bureaucratic structure in place and
what that structure looked like. Paper trails are also a good indication of
U.S. Department of State. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations”
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institutionalization. Generally speaking, the more documents and records an organization
keeps the more institutionalized that organization is. Some other factors that are important
to determining levels of institutionalization are the amount of linkages within an
organization. Extensive linkages within an organization are key to building
institutionalized structures as it ensures communication between members and provides
clarity about the structure of the organization. Finally, to be highly institutionalized, a
terrorist organization needs to be able to use its structure in secret. Terrorist organizations
need to be secretive because a public institutional framework would not serve their goals.
A highly institutionalized terrorist organization not only has an organized institutional
structure but is also able to operate that structure in secret. A more comprehensive list of
ten major criteria I use in evaluating the level of institutionalization within a terrorist
organization can be found in the Appendix.

Measuring the Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this thesis is operational capacity. The operational
capacity of a terrorist organization is its ability to use political violence. In order to
measure operational capacity I have broken it down into a series of indicator variables:
number of attacks, lethality, wounded, type of attack, and location and target of attack.
1. Number of attacks: This is an important indicator in determining the operational
capacity of a terrorist organization because the number of attacks is informative of
how active a terrorist organization is. Terrorist organizations accomplish their
political goals through the use of violent attacks so the ability for a terrorist
organization to launch violent attacks is key to its operational capacity.
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2. Lethality: Not only is the number of attacks important but also how lethal those
attacks are. This indicator can pick up smaller changes in operational capacity than
simply the number of attacks. For example, if the number of attacks after leadership
removal stays the same but the lethality of those attacks falls, it could indicate that
leadership removal disrupted the ability of the terrorist organization to orchestrate
successful terrorist attacks, which would be a decrease in the organization’s
operational capacity.
3. Wounded: The main tool of a terrorist organization is fear and attacks don’t need to
be lethal to instill fear in a target population. The amount of people wounded by
terrorist attacks helps a terrorist organization accomplish its political goals so
should be considered part of a terrorist organization’s operational capacity.
4. Type of Attack: The type of attack is informative of the operational capacity of
terrorist organizations. Bombing attacks take considerable more planning and
leadership than stabbings so a change in a terrorist organization’s repertoire of
violence could signal a change in its operational capacity.
5. Location and Target of Attack: Attacks that take place further away from a
terrorist organization’s central leadership also take considerably more planning and
leadership then local attacks. The targets of these attacks are also important. Rre
terrorist organizations attacking soft targets like markets or public or hard targets
such as military units or diplomatic missions? A change in these indicators
represents a change to the organization’s operational capacity.
All of the data on the indicator variables was taken from the University of Maryland’s
Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Which was created and maintained through the National
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Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START). All of the data
within the GTD is complied and coded from public unclassified documents.
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Chapter III
Aum Shinrikyo
The case of Aum Shinrikyo clearly illustrates how terrorist groups structured
around charismatic authority, but without a strong institutional structure to support them,
will have their operational capacity damaged by leadership removal. Without a clear
institutional structure in place, Aum Shinrikyo was unable to adapt to the shock of
leadership removal, and the organization quickly crumbled.

Background
On March 20th, 1995, five men boarded five separate subway trains on the Tokyo
underground.55 Each of the men carried two seemingly normal items, an umbrella with a
pointed top and a bundle of newspapers.56 Half an hour later, the trains converged at the
Kasumigaseki station in the heart of Japan’s government district. As the five men left their
respective trains, they put their newspapers on the floor and drove their umbrellas through
them.57 Hidden underneath the newspapers were plastic vials of Sarin gas, a chemical
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compound so dangerous that droplet the size of a pinhead can kill an adult.58 At first no one
realized anything was wrong, but after a few minutes people on the trains started feeling
nauseous and then started having seizures and began foaming at the mouth.59 By the time
the conductors of the trains finally realized that something was very wrong, stopped at the
nearest stations, and called emergency personnel to treat the victims, a massive amount of
damage had already been inflicted. Twelve people were killed in that attack and another
5,500 suffered some kind of injury from the gas. Many of the wounded would never fully
recover.60 It was the worst terrorist attack in Japanese history, and it is still the most
devastating instance of a weapon of mass destruction being used by a non-state actor.61
The perpetrators of the terrorist attack all belonged to a cult-like religion called
Aum Shinrikyo. Aum Shinrikyo was founded by Chizuo Matsumoto, who ,after its founding
changed his name to Shoko Asahara to better fit his title of guru, because, during a trip to
India, he claimed he received a message from the deity Shiva and a special mission from the
Dalai Lama himself.62 Shoko Asahara was very skilled in understanding the spiritual needs
of individuals and he created Aum Shinrikyo to be particularly attractive to young people.
The religion incorporated manga and anime, which were not only attractive to a young
audience but also were extremely ingrained in Japanese secular culture.63 The main
message of Aum Shinrikyo was quite simple - modern life is an endless grind, but through
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the teaching of Aum Shinrikyo one could both have fun and obtain enlightenment.64 This
message was so attractive that by 1995, Aum Shinrikyo had over 40,000 members and its
own commune in Japan.65
While the cult of Aum Shinrikyo started out as a nonviolent organization, Shoko
Asahara slowly adjusted its goals, making them more extreme until the attack in March of
1995. In 1989, Shoko Asahara introduced the Tibetan Buddhist idea of poa, the sacred
killing in the name of the spiritual leader, into Aum Shinrikyo.66 The organization also
adopted more apocalyptic beliefs. Aum Shinrikyo, like some sects of Christianity, taught
that Armageddon was fast approaching and when it occurred, only members of Aum
Shinrikyo who had reached enlightenment would be saved from its destruction.67 Shoko
Asahara tried to use this message to gain political power when Aum Shinrikyo formed its
own political party, but after it failed to gain enough votes to join the Japanese parliament,
Shoko Asahara was no longer content on waiting for the apocalypse to end society. The
new goal of Aum Shinrikyo was the absolute destruction of Japanese society.68
Aum Shinrikyo posed a unique challenge to Japanese security. The perpetrators of
the Sarin gas attack were all very highly educated, having attended some of Japan’s finest
universities.69 Furthermore, the possession of Sarin gas showed that Aum Shinrikyo had
the capacity to inflict damage that most terrorist organization could only dream of and the
large numbers of Aum Shinrikyo members dispersed in the Japanese population at large
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made it almost impossible to stop future attacks.70 Given the security challenges posed by
Aum Shinrikyo, it would have been understandable for the Japanese government to have
adopted authoritarian and undemocratic counterterrorism policies towards the entire
organization. However, the Japanese government instead focused exclusively on holding
the leaders of Aum Shinrikyo responsible for the attack, not the organization as a whole.71
While the government did repeal its status as a religious organization, they did not ban the
organization.72 Instead, the Japanese government put its efforts into capturing Shoko
Asahara, which it did about a year after the attack.

Charismatic Authority Within Aum Shinrikyo
The role of Shoko Asahara in Aum Shinrikyo upholds the ideas of the charismatic
leadership theory. Shoko Asahara was completely blind in one eye and partially blind in the
other.73 As a child, he had been sent to a school for the blind, where his partial vision gave
him an advantage over his peers and made him a natural leader. He built his leadership
skill as a child using his gift of limited vision to manipulate his classmates.74 Later, as head
of Aum Shinrikyo, Shoko Asahara incorporated his blindness into his cult of personality.
Shoko Asahara had an unbelievable level of authority over the members of Aum
Shinrikyo. Many ex-members cited him as the main draw of the organization and he had a
profound impact on the people he met. One ex-member was shocked when he met Shoko
Asahara by how knowledgeable and profound he was. 75He spoke with such firm authority.
It felt like from just one short interaction, Shoko Asahara could judge a man’s worth and
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value.76 Shoko Asahara built up these feeling by claiming that he was not an ordinary man.
Building on Hindu theories of existence, Shoko Asahara claimed that he occupied a higher
plane of existence than that of an ordinary man, which allowed him to see, in spite of his
blindness, the course of future events.77 Given that many of the members of Aum Shinrikyo
are on record saying that they thought that the capture of Shoko Asahara by the Japanese
authorities was planned by Shoko Asahara himself as a strategic response to events that
would occur in the future, it appears that the rank and file truly bought into the cult of
personality surrounding Shoko Asahara.78 It is abundantly clear that charismatic authority
was very important in Aum Shinrikyo.
Shoko Asahara also worked to structure the practices of Aum Shinrikyo in a way to
help enhance his charismatic authority. This can be seen in the recruitment and initiation
process of the organization. All of Aum Shinrikyo’s advertising publications heavily
featured Shoko Asahara and his spiritual wisdom.79 The goal of the recruitment process
was to attract people who already felt close to Shoko Asahara, as opposed to the
organization at large. This was even more dramatically reinforced during the initiation
process.
The initiation process was a tool used to cement Shoko Asahara’s authority within
the organization. After an individual would apply to be admitted into Aum Shinrikyo and
had passed vetting and submitted their 10,000 yen fee, they were invited to Aum
Shinrikyo’s initiation process.80 This process usually involved being forced to sit in a dark
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room wearing nothing but a diaper and not being allowed to eat or move without being
told to do so. 81 After this was over, each recruit would get to meet with Shoko Asahara. He
would interact with the recruits and ask them questions about their lives and what they
sought. After this brief interaction, the recruits would be placed on lightly vibrating mats
and be given a tea that caused them to hallucinate (It is suspected that the tea was laced
with LSD).82 During this hallucination the recruits were told to think of Shoko Asahara
because only through him could they avoid bad visions and find the truth.83 While this
ritual is admittedly bizarre, it was incredibly effective in creating a personal devotion
among each recruit to Shoko Asahara. This was an organization entirely built around the
premise that Shoko Asahara was the absolute authority. No other leader within the
organization was elevated anywhere close to his level, so even though there was an
organization behind Shoko Asahara, it was designed so that only he could lead the
organization.

Institutionalization in Aum Shinrikyo
While Aum Shinrikyo lacked a strong organizational structure, because it was a very
large organization, it did have some institutional structures in place that could have
mitigated the effects of leadership removal. The public face of Aum Shinrikyo appeared to
be very structured. Aum Shinrikyo had a downtown Tokyo office with positions that
included head of public relations, general secretary, and official spokesperson.84 The
organization had a media wing that created its own publications, films, and owned
bookstores to raise revenue for the wider organization. The organization also had a list of
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every member and every member of Aum Shinrikyo was required to pay the organization
10,000 yen (around $100) a month.85 Underneath this public organization structure was
another secret one that included a highly advanced chemical weapons manufacturing plant
at the Aum Shinrikyo compound.86 This organizational structure was supported by the
codified belief system of Aum Shinrikyo.
The belief system of Aum Shinrikyo also supported the organization because it
established norms within the group and provided an alternative source of authority within
the organization. The beliefs and practices of Aum Shinrikyo provided a common structure
to the organization that would remain unchanged during leadership removal. Additionally,
this belief system also opened up an alternative source of authority within Aum Shinrikyo.
Charismatic leaders are so important to terrorist organizations because their connection
with their members changes an individual’s rational framework, allowing them to engage
in actions that do not appear to be rational from an individual standpoint, such as suicide
bombing, but are incredibly useful to terrorist organizations.87 However, this authority
does not always have to come from an individual. Religion can also change an individual’s
pre-rational framework. Indeed, Jenna Jordan argues that Islamic terrorist organizations
will not suffer from leadership removal because religion can provide the authority
necessary to run the organization entirely independently of its leaders.88 While Aum
Shinrikyo certainly is not a traditional religion, its belief system could have provided an
alternative source of authority.
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Yet, despite having the trappings of a well-structured organization, Aum Shinrikyo
lacked the organizational infrastructure to allow it to successfully withstand a concerted
counterterrorism effort. All of the previously mentioned institutional structures of Aum
Shinrikyo were part of its public organization. For a terrorist group to be highly
institutionalized, it is essential for them to build what is referred to as a dark organization.
These are organizational structures that can be run in secret. On this account, Aum
Shinrikyo utterly failed. Its terrorist activities were secret from a large part of the
organization, with only the central leadership conceiving and planning operations.89 There
were also poor linkages between different parts of Aum Shinrikyo. The group had several
campuses with local leaders, but these leaders did not interact with each other and
received all their instructions from the central leadership.90 This structure left Aum
Shinrikyo in a poor position to rely exclusively on its organizational structure to support its
terrorist activities.

Impact of Leadership Removal
The removal of Shoko Asahara from the head of Aum Shinrikyo ended the
organization’s ability to function as an effective terrorist organization. This can easily be
seen by examining the group’s terrorist attacks. While Aum Shinrikyo was not a terrorist
organization that had attacked the Japanese state very often before 1995 (see table 1), their
attack had been surprising lethal. The year before their infamous subway attack, the group
launched a terrorist attack that left over 500 casualties.91 They also continued to attack the
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Japanese state after the Sarin gas attacks with smaller terrorist attacks that targeted
government and law enforcement officials.92 The ramping up of Aum Shinrikyo’s attacks
came to an abrupt end around the same time that Shoko Asahara was captured by Japanese
authorities. After his capture, the group did not launch a single attack.93
Terrorist Activity of Aum Shinrikyo94
Year
1993
1994
1995

# of attacks
0
1
6

# of deaths
0
7
14

# of wounded
0
500
5,503

1996

0

0

0

1997

0

0

0

1998

0

0

0

Table 1
The loss of Shoko Asahara also had a devastating impact on Aum Shinrikyo’s
capacity and leadership as well. Aum Shinrikyo quickly lost thousands of its members after
Shoko Asahara was arrested.95 Without the guidance and leadership provided by Shoko
Asahara, the organization quickly folded in on itself.
The existence of both a Aum Shinrikyo’s public organizational structure and its
religious ideology did not prevent the group from being fatally damaged by leadership
removal. This has to do with the structure of the organization and the conditions in which it
operated. The lack of a dark organizational structure prevented the local leaders of Aum
Shinrikyo from understanding what was happening in the different parts of the
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organization or coordinating any of their actions. The reliance on the central leadership for
information, and the secrecy of the central leadership, also severely handicapped Aum
Shinrikyo’s efforts to respond to leadership removal. Some members of Aum Shinrikyo
refused to believe that the organization was responsible for the sarin gas attack. Other
leaders believed that Shoko Asaraha actually wanted to be arrested because he knew of
some coming event that they did not, so they continued to wait for orders from the central
leadership that never came.96
Conditions within Japanese society also ensured that the Aum Shinrikyo “religion”
was not enough of a source of authority to allow other leaders to replace Shoko Asahara.
Despite popular perceptions, religion is not naturally politically salient to individuals.97 It is
made politically salient through political institutions. For example, one of the reasons
religion is prominent in conflicts in the Middle East is that postcolonial societies
redistributed goods along religious lines. This makes religion incredibly important to an
individual’s life chances. This creates an opportunity for political entrepreneurs to use
religion as a basis to mobilize people.98 Since religion is already politically salient in these
societies, the political entrepreneurs don’t need to be particularly skilled or charismatic to
organize along religious lines. This was not the case for Aum Shinrikyo.
Aum Shinrikyo was not made politically salient by the conditions of Japanese
society. Political distribution and equal access were not affected by an individual’s religion.
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Aum Shinrikyo had equal status under Japanese law as any other religion and its
classification as a religion gave it advantages.99The lack of natural grievances against the
Japanese state made it difficult to mobilize members of Aum Shinrikyo against the Japanese
state. It took the uniquely extraordinary skill and charisma of Shoko Asahara to mobilize its
members. The loss of that talent was simply irreplaceable.
There are a couple of lessons on when leadership removal will be effective that can
be drawn from the Aum Shinrikyo case. First, the existence of institutionalization by itself is
not enough on its own to reduce the vulnerability of a terrorist organization to leadership
removal. What matters is how the institutions within a terrorist organization support the
goals of that organization. Terrorist organizations can be built either to increase the
survivability of the organization or to increase the control of its leader over the
organization as a whole. As the Aum Shinrikyo case shows, organizations that try to
prioritize control will be much more susceptible to leadership removal.
Unfortunately, terrorist organizations are not transparent about whether they build
their organization to resist leadership removal or increase the control of the leader over
the organization. There are clues that can help in determining this, though. Nearly every
former member of Aum Shinrikyo, when asked about their experience in the organization
and their motivations for joining, mentioned Shoko Asahara.100 The ubiquity of Shoko
Asahara in the common recruit’s experience shows that the structure of Aum Shinrikyo was
designed to promote the leader. Finding out the motivations of individuals in joining an
organization can provide a useful measuring stick in determining how important an
individual leader is to the overall organization.
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Another important conclusion from the Aum Shinrikyo case is that ideology is not
always enough to provide the authority necessary to run a terrorist organization. Without
factors that promote the political salience of religion, terrorist organizations will rely more
heavily on authority from charismatic figures than authority derived from an ideology.
There are two important implications from this. The first is that leadership removal should
not be discounted as a tactic against terrorist organizations that are religious or
ideologically driven. Instead, each terrorist organization’s ideology needs to be evaluated
within the conditions it operates.
The second, and more important, implication from the Aum Shinrikyo case is that
liberal democracies should try to avoid making ideology or religion politically salient in
their counterterrorism operations. One of the best tactics of the Japanese government after
the Sarin gas attacks was to treat the counterterrorism operation as a criminal affair
instead of a military one. The main way they did this was by choosing to punish the leaders
and perpetrators of the attack, as opposed to the entire Aum Shinrikyo religion. This gave
many of the members of Aum Shinrikyo an opportunity to opt out of the organization and it
prevented members uninvolved in the attack from feeling persecuted by the government.
This strategy ensured that after the removal of Shoko Asahara, the ideology of Aum
Shinrikyo was not strong enough to allow for the continued use of terrorism by the
organization. This lesson is particularly relevant to the United States’ counterterrorism
operations against Islamic terrorist organizations and supports the policy of the United
States to make clear that it is not at war with Islam, but rather a group of violent criminals.
While the case of Aum Shinrikyo provides useful variables for evaluating the
effectiveness of leadership removal on terrorist organizations, there are potential problems
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with trying to apply the case too broadly. The case can be criticized because, unlike most
terrorist organizations, many of the members who joined Aum Shinrikyo had no inkling of
the terrorist wing of the organization.101 Therefore, some of the collapse in the Aum
Shinrikyo organization might have been due to the horrified members finding out about the
nature of the organization they joined. This would make it hard to pinpoint the blame for
Aum Shinrikyo’s collapse on the removal of Shoko Asahara.
This criticism of the Aum Shinrikyo case tends to discount the capacity of the
organization. Even though some members of Aum Shinrikyo were unaware of all of the
group’s terrorist involvement, a large number of them were dedicated to terrorist
activities. The creation of biological weapons required lots of inputs, not only of equipment
and workers, but also experts and scientific know-how.102 This was an operation that
required the knowledge of many individuals within Aum Shinrikyo. Additionally, even
before the Tokyo subway attack, Aum Shinrikyo had been involved in a series of terrorist
activities. Between 1992-1995, the group had been involved in a string of murders and had
also launched another Sarin gas attack in Japan, although this one was much less lethal than
the 1995 attack.103 The definitive stop to Aum Shinrikyo’s ability to function as a terrorist
organization occurred when Shoko Asahara was captured.
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Chapter IV
Hamas
The case of Hamas illustrates how terrorist organizations that are not dependent on
charismatic authority and have strong institutional structures will be resilient to leadership
removal. While Hamas had a very charismatic leader, charismatic authority was not
important in keeping the organization together. Instead, Hamas relied heavily on its
sophisticated organizational structure and local networks to support the organization’s
terrorist activities. This structure allowed Hamas to easily absorb the shock of leadership
removal and ultimately leadership removal ended up strengthening Hamas’ position in the
West Bank.

Background
In the 1970s, the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) were the two main actors in the Israeli Palestinian crisis. They clashed violently in
Israel, Palestine, and the Gaza Strip. To adapt to Israel’s overwhelming military superiority,
the PLO embraced terrorism to not only to combat Israel but also to raise the profile of the
Palestinian liberation struggle.104 In the midst of this violent turmoil, a small offshoot of the
regional Muslim Brotherhood organization broke away from the main organization and
formed its own Islamic group. In 1978, this organization was officially recognized by the
Khaled Hroub, “Hamas after Shaykh Yasin and Rantisi,” Journal of Palestinian Studies,
Vol. 33 No. 4, Summer 2004, 21.
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Israeli Military Administrative and given the right to set up administrative units and
control religious and educational institutions in the West Bank.105 The Israel government
hoped this organization would compete with the PLO for supporters thereby weakening
Palestine resistance to Israel.106 The Israel government could not have known at the time
that they had just given the green light to an organization that would evolve into one of the
most sophisticated and capable terrorist organizations in the region and one of Israel’s
greatest enemies.
The co-founder of the new organization, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, had no interest in
creating an organization that would only focus on development in the West Bank. From the
beginning he imagined his organization as a group that would reclaim all of Palestine for
Palestinians.107 To make the goal of his organization clear, he named it Harakat alMuqawama al-Islamiyya (Hamas), which translates to the Islamic Resistance Movement.108
Hamas quickly occupied a unique position in a region that was filled with resistance groups
and terrorist organizations.
Hamas had a couple of advantages that helped it grow strong in its early years. First,
it was an Islamic organization and it fought not only to reclaim Palestine in general, but
also to make liberated Palestine an Islamic state.109 This helped distinguish Hamas from its
much larger and more established rival, the PLO, which was a secular organization.
Secondly, Hamas benefited from fortunate timing. The organization’s early years coincided
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with the end of the first intifada. The bloody struggle between the PLO and Israel had not
only degraded the operational capacity of the PLO, but also left the organization bankrupt
in the minds of many Palestinians.110 This provided the groundwork for Hamas to quickly
expand. Finally, while the PLO at the end of the first intifada was willing to negotiate with
Israel, Hamas remained committed to refusing to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist.111
After several years of quickly growing, Hamas became a dominant regional actor.
Hamas was able to use its growing clout to stand out as a major player in the second
intifada. As the Palestinian region once again erupted into conflict, Hamas stood out for the
brutality of its attacks. Under the direction of Yassin, Hamas adopted suicide bombing as its
primary strategy.112 In Yassin’s mind, the suicide bomber was the only response
Palestinians had to Israel tanks. Hamas was the only organization in the conflict to fully
engage in a campaign of suicide bombing, causing the organization to stand out in the
Israeli defense establishment’s mind as a major threat.
Understandably, the campaign of Hamas suicide bombers caused a lot of fear in
Israel. By their very nature, suicide bombers cannot be deterred. The only way to stop
suicide bombers is to deny them access to their target or to prevent individuals from
deciding to become suicide bombers in the first place. Major Israeli defense officials started
to look at leadership removal as a way fulfill the latter option.113 Yassin was the leader of
Hamas who made it the strategy of the organization to undertake suicide bombings and
who was insistent on refusing to recognize the right of Israel to exist.114 Over the course of
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the previous decade, he had spent much of his life in and out of Israeli prisons, and had
even been given a life sentence at one point in time only to be released in a prisoner
exchange.115 When the Israel state struck this time, they would remove him permanently.
Since 2000, Israel had acknowledged that they engaged in a policy of targeted
assassination against certain militants.116 The decision to target Yassin was different than
most of Israel’s previous operations though, because Yassin was not just some mid-level
commander or bomber maker, but the main political leader of Hamas.117 This was
important because Hamas was not just a terrorist organization but also a legitimate
political entity that provided social services, set up schools, and ran charities across the
Gaza Strip and West Bank.118 Targeting such a leader would send a signal that the rules of
engagement had changed and risked international condemnation.
Despite the risks, Israel determined that the potential damage to the organization of
Hamas that leadership removal could accomplish was greater than the risks, and despite
being in a cease-fire with Hamas at the time gave the green light for the assassination. On
the 22nd of March 2004, an Israel F-16 flew over the home of Yassin. The roar of the jet’s
engines drowned out the noise of two Apache attack helicopters as they made their
approached. As Yassin was wheeled out of his home on his daily trip the mosque, the
helicopters fired hellfire missiles at Yassin instantly killing him, his two bodyguards, and
inflicting significant collateral damage including wounding two of Yassin’s sons.119 Despite
the collateral damage though, the operation was considered a success and the Israel
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defense establishment expected Hamas to suffer significantly from the loss of their political
and spiritual leader.

The Charismatic Authority of Yassin within Hamas
While I have listed Hamas as an organization with low levels of charismatic
authority, there is no denying that Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was a charismatic individual.
When Yassin was 16 years old, he suffered an accident while playing on a beach that
damaged his spinal cord and left him confined to a wheelchair for the rest of his life.120
Much like Shoko Asahara of Aum Shinrikyo, Yassin took his personal disability and used it
to enhance his personal authority. His calm demeanor, wizard like appearance, and being
confined to a wheelchair gave Yassin the air of an individual who was close to God, which
increased the legitimacy of Yassin spiritual directives. This was in spite of the fact that
Yassin had never actually received any type of official religious training. There is no doubt
that Yassin used his charismatic appeal to his advantage as the spiritual and political leader
of Hamas.
Yassin also showed great charisma through his piety. While Yassin had the means to
live comfortably, he chose to live a very modest lifestyle. He was very committed to the
teaching of Islam and attended prayer daily.121 He gave extensively to charities, in
particular to religious and educational charities.122 He did this in spite of having eleven
children of his own with his wife.123 Yassin’s lifestyle made him seem to truly be a man of
the people. The people of Gaza saw themselves in him and saw him as a father figure to all
of them. This made Yassin an unbelievably popular political leader.
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Given that Yassin is clearly a charismatic leader, why have I chosen to classify
Hamas as an organization with low levels of charismatic authority? The reason is that while
Yassin was a leader with clear charismatic traits he failed to consolidate charismatic
authority within Hamas behind him. Charismatic authority is not simply the existence of
charisma within an individual, it is the use of the authority granted by charisma to exert an
individual’s will over an organization and weld it together. This did not happen in the case
of Hamas.
One of the clearest illustrations of how charismatic authority was not consolidated
across Hamas is in local level dynamics. While at the top, Hamas was an hierarchical
organization, at the local level, Hamas was a networked organization focused around many
different local leaders who held authority in their communities based on family ties,
religious affiliations, or personal charisma.124 This led to many situations where the
authority of local or mid-level leaders ended up trumping Yassin’s authority. For example,
during Hamas’ conflict with Israel in 2000, Yassin made it clear that he would not negotiate
with Israel. The military wing, ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam blatantly ignored Yassin and issued an
order to Hamas military units to stop engaging Israel and declare a truce.125 This led to a
very public fight between Yassin and the military groups, in which Yassin had to make a
public announcement that: “Hamas did not declare a truce. . . . The political wing, not the
military wing drafts the politics of Hamas.”126 Despite the charismatic appeal of Yassin, he
failed to consolidate his authority over Hamas. Indeed, by the time of his assassination,
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Yassin, despite being its official political leader, was not heavily involved in the day-to-day
operations of Hamas.
Another reason that Yassin failed to consolidate his charismatic authority was that
many of the traits that were essential to his charisma were not considered unique to him
but rather a product of the organization of Hamas. In order to establish authority, it is very
important that the charismatic traits of the leader are considered to be unique. Shoko
Asahara was considered the only person in the organization of Aum Shinrikyo who had
obtained enlightenment, which provided him and no one else the ultimate authority within
the organization. In Hamas though, the traits that made Yassin popular and charismatic
were common among the general leadership. For example, much of Yassin’s appeal came
from his modest lifestyle and how in touch with the struggles of ordinary people he
remained despite being in the political leadership.127 However, this was true across all
levels of leadership within Hamas. At every level, members of Hamas were considered to be
clean and honest individuals, in contrast to its rival in the PLO, who cared deeply about the
prosperity of its people.128 The ubiquitous nature of these traits within the organization of
Hamas makes it difficult for one leader to use the traits to claim absolute authority. Instead
within the eyes of the members of Hamas it is the organization itself, rather than any
individual leader within the organization, that holds authority. The success of Hamas in
consolidating authority behind the organization instead of behind its leaders has much to
thank from the institutionalization of the organization.
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Institutionalization in Hamas
Hamas has a complicated but remarkably effective institutional layout that allows
the organization to balance multiple goals while operating under significant pressure. The
organization of Hamas is split into four separate units, security, military, political activities,
and Islamic teaching.129 Every single one of these units is well organized in a bureaucratic
fashion with each having their own office in the Gaza Strip.130 Overseeing these four
administrative units is a political bureau and consultative council that are the main
authority wielding organs in Hamas.
While Yassin was the most visible and powerful leader within the political bureau
and consultative council, he was far from the only high-powered political figure in these
institutions. In Hamas’ upper echelons, there were two types of leaders, insiders and
outsiders.131 The insiders were leaders who were in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank
dealing with the daily administrative functions of Hamas.132 The outside leaders operated a
sophisticated support network for Hamas abroad that tried to increase support for the
cause of Palestinian liberation in the international community, particularly among
European Muslims. The outside leadership sat atop their own sophisticated institutional
infrastructure that organized large events, issued its own publications, and actively raised
money for Hamas.133 The outside leadership even had its own office in Dallas, Texas, until
Hamas was branded by the United States as a terrorist organization.134 Both the outside
and inside leadership of Hamas had an equal number of representatives in the political
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bureau and consultative council that ensured that even though there was a hierarchy of
leaders within those bodies, there was enough power sharing that no one leader was too
essential to the organization as a whole.135
The smaller administrative branches within Hamas also helped insulate it from the
impacts of leadership removal. Hamas was not just a terrorist organization but also a
governing organization that provided for the social services and education of the Gaza Strip
and West Bank.136 This aspect of Hamas provided two important benefits to the
organization that increased it resilience to leadership removal. First, the presence of
administrative units within the Gaza Strip and West Bank increased the legitimacy of the
organization of Hamas in the eyes of its people. Hamas’ work in the Gaza Strip and West
Bank elevated the importance of the organization over the importance of the organization’s
top leader. Secondly, the different administrative units of Hamas provided a training
ground for future leaders of the organization and increased the authority of local leaders
within Hamas. Hamas’ political administrative unit in particular was full of professional
bureaucrats operating within a well-established institutional arrangement.137 Not only did
this give Hamas a deep well of political talent to draw on, it also meant that the
administrative units were the organization’s most visible face to its supporters. This
diluted the importance of Hamas’ top leadership.
Furthermore, the networked organization of Hamas on the local level also diluted
the authority of the top leadership, making the organization more resilient to leadership
removal. As mentioned in the previous section, at the local level, Hamas was a networked
Ibid, 581.
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association of interpersonal relationships.138 This organization style meant that local
leaders were the most important figures within their jurisdiction, and that made the overall
organization less reliant on a hierarchal structure to operate effectively. This meant that on
a local level, the policies and choices of Hamas were determined more through an
interaction of important local political figures than the decisions of the organization’s top
leaders. In Hamas, decision-making was focused on discussions and consensus building.
The orders of local leaders were carried out on the basis of local information and with the
use of local resources, and local activists were independent political agents concerned
about local issues and being competent in their positions as opposed to simply general
administrators whose sole function was to blindly follow directives from the top.139
In addition to providing a counter veiling force to the authority of the central
leadership, the different administrative units of Hamas also pooled resources and
supported each other.140 The parts of Hamas that were involved in the struggle for
Palestinian liberation and the terrorism that accompanied it, and the parts of Hamas
involved in the administration of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, while having separate
official administrative bodies, were tightly bound together. The charities run by the
organization, in addition to the good they did for the Palestinian people, also funneled cash
into the provision of armaments.141 Local leaders used the authority they had within their
communities to recruit members to Hamas’ military wing, and used local networks to
increase the efficiency of intelligence gathering. These types of activities ensured that there
were strong linkages and a long record of communication and collaboration between the
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different administrative units of Hamas. These linkages served to undercut the importance
of hierarchy in Hamas, making the overall organizational structure look more like a web
than a pyramid.

The Effects of Leadership Removal on Hamas
Hamas is seemingly a perfect example of the institutionalization theory in practice.
Hamas is an enormous organization with a wide range of responsibilities to carry out. In
order most efficiently execute its responsibilities, a massive institutional structure
supports Hamas. This structure undercuts the importance of any one leader to the overall
organization and ensures that the organization will be resilient in the face of leadership
removal. Even though Hamas had a charismatic head in Yassin, the structure of the
organization prevented him from consolidating his charismatic authority, reducing his
overall importance to Hamas.
Just looking at the raw empirical data on the lethality of Hamas though, it is easy to
reach the opposite conclusion. The year Yassin was assassinated, Hamas was 62% less
lethal than it had been the year before and wounded 64% fewer people (See Table 2).142
Furthermore, in the proceeding two years, Hamas’ lethality continued to fall and remained
far below its peak in 2002. The lethality of Hamas only rebounded in 2007 three years after
leadership removal.143 From the raw numbers it appears that leadership removal had a
significant impact on Hamas.
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Hamas’ Terrorist Activity 2001-2007
Year

Attacks

Killed

Wounded

2001

39

136

791

2002

34

207

729

2003

39

131

344

2004 (removal)

19

49

125

2005

22

16

21

2006

27

13

31

2007

65

109

344

Table 2
There are two problems with using the aggregate data to discount the theory of
organizational resilience and claim victory for leadership removal. Firstly, the data is also
displaying efforts by the Israeli government to reduce the lethality of Hamas that were not
leadership targeting, and, secondly, breaking the data down reveals a significant revenge
effect in response to leadership removal.
There were two developments outside of leadership removal that caused the
number of terrorist attacks by Hamas to drop so significantly from 2003 to 2004. The first
development was an agreed ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Both parties were
exhausted from the brutality of the first intifada, so had agreed to an uneasy ceasefire
during 2004.144 While the data shows that the ceasefire was not completely successful, a
significant drop in the level of terrorist attacks attributed to Hamas can be attributed to the
ceasefire.
144
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The second, and more important, development in the Israeli Palestinian crisis that
contributed to the decrease of lethality of Hamas was the construction of the West Bank
Barrier, which was completed at the end of 2003. As stated earlier, Hamas was notable as a
terrorist organization because of its prolific use of suicide bombers and they only way to
stop suicide bombers is to prevent their recruitment or prevent them from accessing their
targets.145 The West Bank Barrier was a series of walls and security checkpoints that
isolated the West Bank from Israel denying suicide bombers access to Israeli targets.146 The
effectiveness of this strategy can be seen in how Hamas shifted its targeting. When the
lethality of Hamas increased back to the level comparable to the 2000-2003 period, the
locations of its targets had changed to be almost entirely in the West Bank since its
bombers had a much harder time accessing Israel. 147 The effect that the data on lethality is
showing in the case of Hamas is not that leadership removal reduced the operational
capacity of Hamas but rather that the West Bank Barrier made the primary strategy of
Hamas less lethal.
This conclusion is reinforced when the data on the number of attacks is more closely
examined. While the year of Yassin assassination also had the fewest number of attack
perpetrated by Hamas, as well as the fewest deaths, this is mostly because of the
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ceasefire.148 In 2004, before the assassination of Yassin, there were only five terrorist
attacks by Hamas. The assassination of an old, ailing, half-blind, wheel chair bound man by
Israeli gunships though, made the members of Hamas angry enough to retract the ceasefire
and increase attacks on Israel in retaliation.149 In the part of 2004 after the death of Yassin,
the number of terrorist attacks rose to fourteen, but because of the effectiveness of the
West Bank Barrier, the fatalities of these attacks deceased.150 In 2007, Hamas actually
launched more attacks than it did during its most lethal year in 2002, but the death to
attack ratio fell from 6:1 to 1.6:1.151 The drop in the effectiveness in suicide bombing can
again be credited to the West Bank Barrier. By 2007, Hamas was barely able to launch a
single attack in the state of Israel and instead focused all of its attacks in the West Bank,
which had fewer of the soft targets that made suicide bombing so successful in the early
2000s.152
Since there were complicating variables during Hamas leadership removal, the best
way to determine the effects of leadership removal is to examine how the internal
dynamics of Hamas changed after Yassin’s death. Within Hamas, Yassin was quickly
replaced by Abdel Aziz Al-Rantissi. Rantissi was a leader who was a decade younger than
Yassin and very energetic with his own charismatic appeal.153 Rantissi had no issues
effectively assuming command within Hamas. He did not alter the organization’s stance on
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Israel or its commitment to the use of suicide bombers.154 He was so successful in replacing
Yassin that Israel decided he had to go. He was assassinated after a little more than a month
in Hamas’ top position.155 Even the assassination of Rantissi though, did not disrupt the
functioning of Hamas.156 What the assassination did do was increase the power of the
outside leadership in the political bureau of Hamas. Ironically, this was a bad development
for Israel because the outside leadership tended to be more radical than the inside
leadership since they were less concerned about on the ground developments.157
Leadership removal did not disrupt the leadership of Hamas, it just empowered the more
radical leaders within Hamas.
In addition to failing to disrupt the leadership of the organization, leadership
removal also increased the political strength of Hamas. Hamas for most of its existence had
operated as an inferior organization to the PLO. The PLO had a longer history of struggle
against Israel, held significantly more resources than Hamas, and most importantly, had
more support among the general population.158 After the assassination of Yassin though,
for the first time in the history of its organizational lifetime, the population of the West
Bank had a more favorable view of Hamas than the PLO.159 The assassinations of its leaders
led to a groundswell of support for an organization that was more radical than the PLO.
Eventually, Hamas was able to use its newfound political strength to increase its attacks on
Israel. It was only the effectiveness of Israel’s other counterterrorism policies that
prevented Hamas from becoming a more lethal organization after leadership removal.
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The case of Hamas illustrates how institutionalized terrorist organizations without
consolidated charismatic authority can successfully withstand leadership removal. The
case supports the logic laid out by organizational resilience theorists and also provides
evidence that leadership removal can be counterproductive to counterterrorism goals.
Leadership removal cannot be viewed as a silver bullet that will work in every situation.
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Chapter V
The PKK
Leadership removal in the case of the PKK provides valuable insights into the
competing influences of charismatic authority and institutionalization within terrorist
groups. On one hand, the loss of Abdullah Öcalan’s charismatic authority within the PKK
after his removal left the organization rudderless and led it to change its tactics for
achieving political change from terrorism to political negotiation. On the other hand, the
highly bureaucratic and institutional nature of the PKK was not disrupted by leadership
removal, and when political negotiations with the Turkish state failed, the PKK returned to
terrorism and proved that leadership removal had not diminished its operational capacity.

Background
In 1984, a small group of Kurdish militants attacked Turkish military units in the
predominantly Kurdish regions of the country. These attacks continued sporadically
throughout the year.160 At first, the Turkish government paid little attention to the attacks.
Government spokesmen wrote off the attacks as the work of common bandits.161 However,
as the attacks continued, they became such an annoyance to the Turkish government that a
military response was launched. Martial law was declared in the region, which allowed for
Özlem Pusane “Turkey’s Military Victory over the PKK and its Failure to End the PKK
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the government to conduct military operations. At first, these seemed successful. The
militant group was reduced to little more than 200 members.162 Eventually, though, the
group adapted to the government’s response by increasing its recruitment efforts and
creating a sophisticated training-regiment for its members. By 1987, the threat couldn’t be
contained and the Turkish government declared a state of emergency across ten provinces
in southeastern and eastern Turkey, the region that contained most of the state’s Kurdish
population.163 This action escalated a conflict that would dominate Turkish affairs
throughout the 1990s and posed a real threat to the Turkish state: A conflict between the
Turkish government and a Kurdish-based insurgent group, known as the People’s Kurdish
Party (PKK).
By the 1990s, the PKK was inflicting serious damage on the Turkish government.
While the PKK was responsible for only 1,619 deaths between 1984 and 1990, from 1991
to 1993, it killed 4,132 individuals.164 The greater death toll in a shortened period of time
showed how the PKK was able to increase its operational capacity, despite the increased
military campaign against them. The PKK also employed brutal terrorist attacks as one of
its main weapons against the Turkish state. These attacks not only targeted military units,
but government and social workers as well. In its increased campaign against the Turkish
states, the PKK abducted and murdered over 200 Turkish teachers in Kurdish regions over
a three-year period.165 The PKK operational capacity was so great that for much of the
southeastern and southern parts of Turkey, residents were members of the Turkish state
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by day ,but would be under the authority of the PKK at night. In some areas of Turkey, the
central government lost all functional control.166
The PKK had been founded as a Marxist-Leninist Party by Abdullah Öcalan. After a
few years of failing to gain significant momentum within Turkish institutions, Öcalan
reorganized the PKK for the purpose of becoming the sole representative for the Kurdish
people in an armed struggle against the Turkish state.167 Through brilliant and often brutal
political maneuvering, Öcalan managed to position the PKK as the only legitimate
organization that could respond to the needs of the Kurdish population.
Öcalan’s prominent role in the PKK made him an ideal target for the Turkish
government. As the lethality of the PKK continued to increase over the course of the 1990s,
the Turkish government made the capturing or killing of the elusive Öcalan one of their top
priorities.168 Eventually, in 1999, Turkish intelligence officials discovered that Öcalan was
staying in Damascus. The Turkish government sent the Syrian government an ultimatum:
give up Öcalan or face immediate invasion.169 The Syrian government capitulated to
Turkish demands and, after a series of long and highly publicized flights, Öcalan ended up
in the hands of Turkish officials.170
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Charismatic Authority in the PKK
Öcalan displayed a significant level of charismatic authority over the PKK. The
followers of the organization affectionately nicknamed him Apo, short for Abdullah, and
viewed him as a father figure, not only for the organization, but for the Kurdish people as
well.171 Öcalan certainly did his best to cultivate this image. In response to his followers
nicknaming him Apo, he declared that all members of the PKK would be called Apocular or
“Apo’s people.” He also made it clear that he was one with the organization. Everything that
the PKK did, every attack that it launched, and every position it took, was claimed as the
responsibility of Öcalan.172 He built himself as not only the leader of the PKK, but as the sole
leader and sworn protector of the Kurdish people. The greatest success of his charismatic
authority was his ability to tie himself into ideas of Kurdish identity.
Öcalan, much like Shoko Asahara, used the organizational structure of the PKK to
enhance his own control over the organization. In order to consolidate his charismatic
authority within the PKK, Öcalan centralized the organization around himself and removed
rivals within the PKK. Öcalan ran the PKK in an incredibly brutal and authoritarian fashion.
The first victims of the PKK’s violence were not members of the Turkish government, but
fellow Kurds.173 Öcalan destroyed any other group that tried to support or advocate for
Kurdish rights. After he had consolidated the PKK as the only group that could represent
the Kurdish people, he quickly went about eliminating rival leaders within the PKK. Under
his leadership, purges were swift, frequent, and brutal. Öcalan killed every founding
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member of the PKK, other than himself.174 The same individuals who had masterminded
the 1984 attacks against the Turkish state with Öcalan were killed because of the risk they
posed to Öcalan’s authority within the PKK.
No official was too close to Öcalan to be safe from his purges. When his own wife
started to display more ambition within the PKK and rumors started to circulate that she
could become a successor in case he was killed, Öcalan tried to assassinate his wife, who
only escaped by fleeing to Europe.175 No offense was too small to incite a purge either.
Once, one high-ranking official within the PKK suggested to Öcalan that they should focus
more heavily on engaging with European Kurds and build and international coalition that
would employ nonviolent means of resistance against the Turkish state instead of simply
being an organization for Kurdish armed resistance. Öcalan did not take this well and had
the official promptly assassinated.176

Institutionalization in the PKK
As prevalent as charismatic authority was within the PKK, there were also a
multitude of factors that suggested that the PKK would be resilient in the face of leadership
removal. One of these factors was the level of bureaucratization within the PKK. The PKK
was such a large organization, and included so many different branches with vastly
different goals and operations, that it had to build a complex bureaucracy to operate
efficiently. The PKK was a multi-branched organization with a main operational leadership
group in located in Turkey that planned and executed terrorist attacks for the organization.
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Additionally, the PKK had two sister branches in Syria and Iraq, which were responsible for
publications, propaganda, and recruitment, and a separate organization for women
fighters.177
In addition to how large the PKK was as an organization, it also took on complex
state-building and political roles that forced it to adopt a sophisticated, institutional
framework. The PKK, at various points in its violent campaign against the Turkish state
controlled vast amounts of land. In these areas, it set up an administrative apparatus that
levied taxes on the local population, conducted forced enlistment into the PKK, and
provided social services to Kurdish residents.178 Not only did the PKK have its own
administrative territory to run, it was also involved in Turkish and international politics.
While the PKK was banned as a political party in Turkey at this time, there were Kurdish
members of the Turkish Parliament within existing political parties that harbored
sympathies with the PKK and would work with the organization to influence the Turkish
government within Turkish institutions.179 The PKK also engaged in a concentrated effort
to build support among the Kurdish diaspora for the Kurdish cause. This was used not only
to increase recruitment for the PKK using the diaspora, but also to use the diaspora to put
pressure on foreign governments to come out and support the PKK’s cause in the
international arena.180 These political positions all required skill and capable political
operatives. Given the wide extent and far reaching activities of the PKK the organization
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should have had the ability to find a suitable replacement to Öcalan to take over the mantel
of the PKK after his capture.
Another reason it was unlikely that leadership removal would significantly reduce
the lethality of the PKK is that the underlining motivation and justification for the PKK did
not go away with the capture of Öcalan. The PKK became the official body of Kurdish
grievances in Turkey.181 The Turkish state was very oppressive toward its Kurdish citizen
and treated them as second class within its own society. The Kurdish regions of Turkey are
also some of that county’s poorest and opportunities for advancement among the Kurdish
population are incredibly low.182 The military campaign by the Turkish government only
exacerbated Kurdish grievances. The Turkish response to PKK attacks was often brutal and
indiscriminate. The Turkish army frequently embarked on reprisal attacks and villageburning operations as part of their counterterrorism effort.183 Torture of suspects without
due process was a commonplace occurrence and many Kurds would be abducted by the
state and never heard from again. 184
Being Kurdish in Turkey has real implication for an individual’s life chances. Given
the politically salience of Kurdish ethnicity in Turkey and the strong institutional structure
of the PKK to support its terrorist activities, the PKK should have the ability to recover from
leadership removal.
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Results of Leadership Removal
The removal of Öcalan from the head of the PKK had a profound effect on the
organization. Directly after his capture, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire with the
Turkish government.185 Despite sporadic breakdowns in the ceasefire, the amount of
attacks launched by the PKK fell dramatically (See table 3) and the PKK continued to
engage diplomatically with the Turkish government throughout the mid 2000s. For the
Turkish government, removing Öcalan had an immediate and positive impact on their
security. Unfortunately, the chance of ending the conflict through political negotiations was
squandered and the PKK returned to its insurgency against the Turkish government. When
the PKK returned to arms, they proved that leadership removal had not altered their
organization’s ability to conduct violent attacks.
One of the main reasons that the removal of Öcalan led the PKK to switch its tactics
to political negotiations was Öcalan’s leadership purges had removed many of the radical
lower level leaders within the PKK allowing for more moderate voices to step in. Öcalan
used frequent purges of the PKK’s leadership as a means to enhance his own charismatic
authority within the organization. A large component of his charismatic authority was
melding of the struggle for a Kurdish state and his personal brand. Öcalan built this myth
that he was the only person within the PKK who could lead the Kurdish people to
liberation. Leaders within the PKK who were more radical in their resistance to the Turkish
state threatened this image and were purged. Subsequently the leaders who remained in
the PKK were moderates who were good at keeping their heads down and carrying out the
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will of Öcalan. The loss of Öcalan allowed these leaders to step in and change the direction
of the organization.
PKK Terrorist Activity 1997-2003186
Year

Attacks

Deaths

Wounded

1997

16

127

14

1998

11

27

37

1999

46

105

233

2000

3

4

2

2001

2

7

4

2002

0

0

0

2003

3

7

6

Table 3
The capture of Öcalan as opposed to his death was also a useful force in reducing the
lethality of the PKK. Having Öcalan in the custody of the Turkish state while still being the
head of the PKK put the organization in a tricky place. Even as the organization was roiling
from the loss of its founder and trying to find replacements, Öcalan was still sending orders
to the organization through his lawyers and family visitors.187 It was Öcalan who proposed
the ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish government while he was in custody. The
fact that his health and well-being depended on the Turkish state probably helped convince
him to switch his position from violent confrontations to negotiation. This switch in

All figures are compiled from the Global Terrorism Database’s PKK dataset. Leadership
removal occurred in 1999.
187 Pusane, “Turkey’s Military Victory over the PKK and its Failure to End the PKK
Insurgency.” 727-728.
186

67

position sent the PKK into an identity crisis. The members who wanted to resist could not
be sure if there were members of the organization who still supported Öcalan enough that
they would try to oppose them. In addition, now that Öcalan was out of the picture there
was also a much larger moderate voice in the PKK advocating for a ceasefire.188 This
moderate voice used the legitimacy that Öcalan still had within the organization to pursue
control of the organization. It was remarkably effective, as almost immediately after the
capture of Öcalan the moderates were able to seize control of the PKK, and with Öcalan’s
blessing, started political negotiations with Turkey.
After using his authority to help justify their take over of the organization though,
the new leaders of the PKK started to reduce Öcalan’s authority within the PKK. Over the
next couple years, the PKK repeatedly rebranded itself as a way to diminish Öcalan’s hold
over the organization. This was only partially successful, as the PKK has never managed to
fully disentangle itself from Öcalan’s image. Even today under the banner of the new PKK
Öcalan’s imprisonment is still used as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Turkish
government.189 However, Öcalan’s imprisonment is no longer enough to keep the PKK
away from using terrorist tactics. After years of failing to achieve their political goals
through negotiations, the PKK returned to its insurgency as an incredibly capable and
effective organization (See table 4).
There are several important points to take away from the PKK case. First, the
reaction of the PKK to the removal of Öcalan shows that charismatic leaders are important
to the direction of their organization even when their organization has a strong
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institutional structure to support it. Öcalan’s capture by Turkey fundamentally altered the
actions of the PKK. He had so successfully consolidated his authority within the PKK that he
was still able to influence the decision making process in the PKK from a Turkish prison.
This shows that despite whatever institutional processes are in place, leaders are
incredibly important in determining how their organizations are run.
PKK Terrorist Activity 2012-2016
Year

Attacks

Killed

Wounded

2012

43

232

390

2013

21

14

14

2014

66

23

41

2015

337

424

840

2016

379

732

2,088

Table 4
The PKK case also illustrates the problems with viewing leadership removal as a
military strategy against terrorist groups with high levels of both charismatic authority and
institutionalization. Leadership removal in the PKK resulted in a less violent organization
not because the organization was harmed to the point where they could not carry violent
attacks against Turkey, but because leadership removal created the conditions within the
PKK for political change to occur in a way that was beneficial to Turkey. When the PKK
returned to it insurgency against the Turkish state, it proved that it had maintained a high
level of operational capacity, launching a greater number, and more violent, attacks than it
had in its heyday in the 1990s.

69

The more effective strategy in reducing the operational capacity of the PKK was the
Turkish military campaign against them. By the time Öcalan was captured by the Turkish
state in 1999, the PKK had been decimated by a brutal Turkish military campaign that put
the organization under a lot of pressure. The amount and lethality of the PKK’s attacks had
fallen from their peak in the mid-1990s. The PKK had lost control of much of the territory
that it had once controlled and its membership had been severely depleted by the extended
military campaign. Yet while the military campaign was able to degrade the operational
capacity of the PKK, it was also extremely costly to the Turkish government. Given that
leadership removal achieved a positive political outcome, could it provide a cheap political
counterterrorism policy solution for terrorist groups with high levels of charismatic
authority and institutionalization?
Unfortunately, the PKK case cannot be generalized too broadly for there were
many factors specific to the PKK that led to the PKK choosing to enter political negotiations
after leadership removal. First, Öcalan’s consolidation of his political authority within the
PKK had removed more radical leaders from the PKK allowing for political moderation
after his removal. This is not always the case. As shown in the Hamas case, leadership
removal can strengthened the hand of radicals within the organization. Additionally, the
capture of Öcalan also helped ensure that the political change within the PKK after his
removal would move in the direction of moderation but it is not always possible to capture
terrorist leaders. Leadership removal simply creates the conditions for political change
within a terrorist group; it does not ensure that the political change will have positive
counterterrorism outcomes. This is seen in the next chapter, where leadership removal led
to the creation of more violent terrorist groups.
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Chapter VI
Al Qaeda
Similar to the case of the PKK, leadership removal in Al Qaeda did not decrease the
operational capacity of the organization. However, unlike the PKK, leadership removal in Al
Qaeda caused the organization to become more violent and regionally-focused.

Background
In 1988, a multimillionaire and war hero from the Soviet-Afghan war set about
creating a new organization to bring the ideas of a jihadist struggle to the rest of the Arab
world. This man was Osama Bin Laden, and the organization that he founded, Al Qaeda,
would become arguably the most influential terrorist organization in history. Its actions
defining international politics for the beginning of the 21st century.
At its inception, Al Qaeda had trouble distinguishing itself from the multitude of
militant Islamist organizations in the Middle East at the time. Like many other groups, it
was based on a Salafiya-Jihadia ideology that advocated for returning the Middle East to
Muslim rule.190 The important distinguishing factor for Al Qaeda in this period was its
leader, Osama Bin Laden, who not only had extensive financial resources to back up his
infant organization but was already inspiring fanatical devotion in Al Qaeda’s members.
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After several years of engaging in terrorist activities against the regimes of Arab
countries, Bin Laden, frustrated with the slow progress toward the organization’s goals,
changed the focus of Al Qaeda. In his mind, the authoritative and secular regimes of the
Arab world would not fall to terrorism until they lost the support of their powerful western
backers.191 Therefore, Bin Laden switched the focus of Al Qaeda to committing acts of
terror against the “far enemy”, the United States and its Western allies.192 His hope was that
the public of the United States would be unwilling to remain involved in the Middle East in
the face of the terrorism.
This strategy was remarkably successful in making Al Qaeda stand out from other
militant Islamic groups, and, by the late 1990s, Al Qaeda had become the foremost terrorist
organization in the Middle East. It had launched dozen of attacks against international
targets, raising the organization’s prominence within the Jihadist community and also
putting it on the radar of Western security organizations.193 The success of Al Qaeda’s early
years convinced Bin Laden that the United States was still suffering from a Vietnam
complex and that Al Qaeda had the ability to bleed the political will out of the United
States.194 This conclusion led to Bin Laden’s approval of the world’s most infamous
terrorist attacks.
On September 11, 2001, members of Al Qaeda hijacked passenger airlines and used
them to attack symbols of the United States’ economic and political dominance. Over 3,000
civilians died in the deadliest attack on American soil. In response, the United States
government declared war on Al Qaeda and its affiliates, wherever they resided in the
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Authorization of Military Force Act.195 This led to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and was
one of many justifications used for the invasion of Iraq. For a decade, one of the main
foreign policy goals of the United States was to kill or capture Osama Bin Laden. On May
2nd 2011, that goal was finally accomplished when U.S. Navy Seals raided a compound in
Pakistan and killed Osama Bin Laden.
Al Qaeda, after the death of Osama Bin Laden, provides a particularly interesting
case study into the effects of decapitation on a terrorist organization because of Al Qaeda’s
unique organizational structure. Osama Bin Laden was an extremely charismatic individual
and his personal appeal was a huge part of the success of Al Qaeda. At the same time, he sat
atop a sophisticated institutional structure that oversaw an organization spanning
countries and continents and containing features that made the organization resistant to
leadership removal.

Charismatic Authority in Al Qaeda
Without Osama Bin Laden, there would have been no Al Qaeda. It was his
charismatic authority that first pulled the organization together. Through brilliant
propaganda and careful presentation, Bin Laden built up a cult of personality and extended
his charismatic authority over far-flung branches of his organization, allowing for Al Qaeda
to become a transnational terrorist organization.
Much of Bin Laden’s charismatic appeal came from his inspiring backstory. He was
the son of an incredibly wealthy Saudi businessman.196 His father owned the largest
company in Saudi Arabia and when he died, Osama Bin Laden inherited over $20 million.
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Despite his massive personal fortune, Bin Laden felt he had a higher calling.197 When the
mujahedeen declared a holy war against the occupying Soviet forces, Bin Laden not only
gave them extensive financial resources, he also left the comfort of Saudi Arabia to become
a field commander in Afghanistan.198 It was there that he made a name for himself in the
jihad movement.
In the war against the Soviet Union, Bin Laden stood out as an excellent and brave
commander adding to the myth surrounding him. In the spring of 1987, Bin Laden engaged
Soviet forces in the battle of Jaji, a brutal, weeks-long battle.199 Personal accounts of Bin
Laden’s bravery made it into the militant Islamist magazine, Jihad, increasing his
recognition across the region.200 Even at this early date, before the organization of Al Qaeda
existed, Bin Laden recognized the value of charismatic authority. When he met some
veteran Islamists, they told him “You are the leader which we can trust. . . we will follow
you.”201 This meeting planted the idea in Bin Laden’s mind that he could create his own
Islamic Army, so he started to work on enhancing his charismatic appeal. Bin Laden invited
Saudi journalists to interview him and even created a documentary about his struggles in
Afghanistan.202 This care for his image would become a hallmark of Al Qaeda.
From its inception, Bin Laden recognized the importance of using his charisma to
establish loyalty within the rank and file of Al Qaeda. While Al Qaeda was still a struggling
organization in Sudan, Osama cultivated personal loyalty by targeting individuals who had
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been abandoned by the state and provided them not only with financial resources, but also
with the feeling that his organization cared about them.203 Bin Laden’s son testified that
this strategy was incredibly effective in inspiring deep personal loyalty. “Many veterans
told my brothers and me that our father was the only one who never forgot them . . . they
worshipped him with their whole hearts.”204 For Bin Laden, this type of loyalty was not a
perk of his organization but necessary to its goals. He believed that jihad would only
succeed through an Arab army that fought under the principle of martyrdom.205 To create
this force, he needed to have something that people would be willing to sacrifice their lives
for ,and he found that in his charismatic appeal.
Bin Laden’s belief in the importance of his charismatic appeal can also be seen
through Al Qaeda’s use of media. Most militant Islamic organizations, such as the Taliban,
viewed modern media as contrary to Islamic teachings and banned it from their
organizations.206 Bin Laden, on the other hand believed that media was instrumental to
accomplishing Al Qaeda’s goals. He remarked in a letter to Mullah Omar, “It is obvious that
the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach
90% of the total preparation for the battles.”207 Al Qaeda’s use of media let it extend Bin
Laden’s charismatic authority and helped the organization receive a steady stream of
foreign fighters. When local Islamist groups pledged their allegiance to Al Qaeda and
adopted their media, they found that the number of foreign fighters they could recruit
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increased dramatically.208 Even the Taliban dropped its opposition to the use of modern
media after pledging allegiance to Al Qaeda.209
Bin Laden was also very conscious to ground his lifestyle in traditional Islamic
teachings. Bin Laden was a fervently religious man and modeled his life after the teachings
of the Prophet Mohammed.210 Despite his extraordinary wealth, Bin Laden lived a very
modest life. He slept on the floor and ate very little throughout the day.211 This helped
ground Bin Laden’s charismatic appeal in the traditional authority of Islam. To his
followers, Bin Laden was not just a savior figure who would usher in Islam to the world, he
was also a physical embodiment of what an individual should be.
In person, he had an amazing ability to make people like him. Despite the horrific
acts of violence that Al Qaeda was engaged in, Bin Laden was reportedly an incredibly
pleasant man. He hated disagreement to the point that he would remain aloof from many of
the major disagreements within the Al Qaeda leadership.212 However, his charismatic
appeal over the organization was so great that every decision was made on the basis of
what Osama would want, even if he did not personally speak on that issue. 213
For the different branches of Al Qaeda, Bin Laden’s authority was key to tying the
organization together. As will be explained more in the next section, Al Qaeda is an
umbrella organization that is comprised of many different regional branches that owe
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allegiance to a central leadership.214 Al Qaeda was an appealing organization for regional
Islamic groups to join because the authority of Bin Laden was so strong that regional
groups associated with Al Qaeda quickly became the dominant group in their region.215 In
exchange for the renown and increased authority that came with an association with Bin
Laden, these regional groups ceded some of their sovereignty to the central leadership
organization. Most frequently, after joining Al Qaeda, these regional Islamic terror groups
would change focus to engage in international terrorism to better align their group with the
goals of the central organization.216 In this way, the authority of Bin Laden served as the
glue that bound the different branches of Al Qaeda together in one common purpose.
Given how important charismatic authority was to the structure of Al Qaeda, it
would be logical to assume that leadership removal would deeply harm the organization’s
ability to function. However, in addition to Bin Laden’s exceptional charisma, he also had an
incredible talent for organization. In Al Qaeda, he built an institutional and hierarchical
structure. This type of structure has the features necessary to be resistant to leadership
removal.

Institutionalization in Al Qaeda
It should not be surprising that son of one of Saudi Arabia’s most successful
businessmen and a former economics major would create a very bureaucratic organization.
Bin Laden had spent his whole life around, or running, complex organizations and that
experience showed in the construction of Al Qaeda.
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Al Qaeda is comprised of two main components, the center and the branches. The
center of Al Qaeda includes a small core leadership contingent that is organized into a very
hierarchical structure (See Fig. 1).217 At the top of this structure is the Amir, the overall
leader of the organization, who was Bin Laden. The Amir is the ultimate authority in the
group with the final say on all religious, operational, and logistic matters. The Amir sets the
goals and provides direction for the entire organization.218 Directly below the Amir is the
Secretary. The Secretary is responsible for turning the decrees of the Amir into action.219
This is a managerial position, and the Secretary is not supposed to replace the Amir.
Around the time of the death of Bin Laden, it was not clear if the secretary position was
occupied or not.220
The second highest position of authority in the organization is the Deputy. The
Deputy is supposed to be the organizations secondary leader. If the Amir is removed during
counter terrorism operations, the Deputy would become the new Amir.221 The Deputy
should hold some of his own authority within Al Qaeda that is independent of the authority
of the Amir.222
Below the deputy is the Command Council. This is the main operational unit of the
Al Qaeda organization. This body is composed of 7-10 high level Al Qaeda officials who
together set about the planning and execution of terrorist attacks.223 The Command Council
is chaired by the Amir who has the final say in all of its decision. In the past, the other
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members of the Command Council have included the head of finance, head of security, head
of general section military, head of the special operations unit, head theologian, head of
media, and official spokesman.224

Figure 1
Underneath the Command Council, the organization of Al Qaeda breaks down into
multiple, specialized units. For this thesis, the most important of these units is the Military
Committee, which provides the resources and recruits to carry out the Command Council’s
planned attacks.225 One wing of the Military Committee, the Military Command Special
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Operations Unit, was responsible for the execution of all of Al Qaeda’s international
terrorist attacks.226
This central leadership structure is located in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
region and is actually a fairly small part of the organization’s overall size.227 The bulk of Al
Qaeda membership and resources comes from the different branches of Al Qaeda that
pledge loyalty to the central leadership.228
The branches of Al Qaeda are a diverse set of regional Islamic terrorist
organizations. Some of the most notable branches of Al Qaeda are the Abu Sayaf Group
(ASG) of the Philippines, the Islamic Jihad Union of Uzbekistan, Al Qaeda in the Maghreb
(AQIM), which operates across North Africa, Al Shabab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),
and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).229 These branches give the Al Qaeda
organization a vast international reach and deep reservoirs of capacity.
The relationship between the center of Al Qaeda and the branches is symbiotic. The
center provides the goals and guidance, while the branches provide the resources to carry
out the goals of the central leadership. This can be seen by comparing the different
branches before and after they joined Al Qaeda. Al Shabab was a regional Islamist group
focused on attacking the decrepit Somali state before it pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda.
Soon after it joined up with Al Qaeda it launched a series of devastating bombings in
Uganda.230 These attacks showed that after joining Al Qaeda, Al Shabab had not only gained
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extended reach with the ability to attack outside of the borders of Somalia, but that the
organizational capacity of Al Shabab had also improved and they could now execute
complicated terrorist attacks that required extensive training. Through their alliance Al
Shabab improved its capacity, while Al Qaeda central leadership gained another ally
through which it could fight the far enemy.
This same process is seen in the AQAP. After joining Al Qaeda, AQAP gained
extended reach and operational abilities that quickly made it the most deadly branch of Al
Qaeda. AQAP was responsible for the attempted Detroit airplane bomber, who successfully
snuck an explosive device through airport security by hiding it in his underwear.231 They
were also accredited in the Fort Hood and Little Rock shootings that targeted American
servicemen on their home soil.232 The multitude of branches of Al Qaeda poses a challenge
for the effectiveness of leadership removal, since it makes the organization a multi-headed
beast.
The incredible sophistication of Al Qaeda’s institutional structure can be seen in the
massive paper trail of the organization. Al Qaeda kept detailed records; it required and had
extensive recruitment profiles drawn up on potential members of the organization with
key areas such as youth, zealousness, and ability to obey orders highlighted as desirable
traits.233 It also engaged in complicated contracts with its members with sections on salary,
holiday, travel expenses, rewards, and punishments.234 The organization had its own daily
and weekly new publications and its media wing was particularly active in the creation and
Bergen, Hoffman, and Tiedemann, “Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat to America
and American Interests,” 72-73.
232 Ibid, 72.
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distribution of videos.235 Even written correspondence between the leaders and branches
of Al Qaeda was formatted in a way that made it read less like communications between
higher-ups in a secretive and violent organization and more like internal memos at a large
multinational firm.236
The institutional nature of Al Qaeda’s organization stands in sharp contrast to its
dependency on charismatic authority and provides a challenge to predicting the outcome of
leadership removal. The extent and importance of Bin Laden’s charismatic authority in the
organization suggests that Al Qaeda would be susceptible to leadership removal while the
complex institutional framework holding up Al Qaeda’s leadership gives one reason to
think leadership removal would be ineffective against Al Qaeda.

Analysis of Leadership Removal
Contrary to the case of the PKK, the killing of Bin Laden did not drastically reduce
the lethality of Al Qaeda. In fact, 2012 was Al Qaeda’s most deadly year in a long time, with
more deaths than the previous three years combined (See table 5).237 Based on this data, it
appears that the removal of Bin Laden created a more violent and more dangerous
organization. However, the raw data hides very interesting regional trends and masks the
damage that leadership removal did to the organization.
Firstly, the rise in lethality in Al Qaeda can be attributed to the increased activity of
Al Qaeda in Iraq and to a much greater extent the AQAP.238 So why did these two branches
Ibid, 23.
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of Al Qaeda suddenly become much more lethal after the death of Bin Laden? The answer
seems to lie with a change of group priorities. As mentioned earlier, one of the key
distinguishing factors between Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups was Al Qaeda’s
commitment to launching sophisticated terrorist attacks against the West.239 The emphasis
on the far enemy meant that Al Qaeda prioritized complex terrorist attacks against highly
visible Western targets as opposed to a multitude of attacks against softer and more local
targets. However, after the removal of Bin Laden, the AQAP seems to have shifted its focus
back to a more regional terrorism, with the goal of undermining the Yemeni state. Nearly
all of the AQAP’s attacks were located within Yemen, and the targets typically included
police stations and military units, signs of the Yemeni state, as opposed to Western
targets.240
The data on the AQAP’s terrorist activities after the death of Bin Laden shows that
the AQAP faced increasing pressures from other Islamist groups. In addition to government
troops, multiple AQAP attacks were targeted at rival terrorist groups.241 The death of Bin
Laden threatened the AQAP’s status as the premier Islamic terrorist organization on the
Arabian peninsula, so the organization quickly moved to eliminate or deter regional rival
and to re-establish its supremacy by conducting large, visible and violent terrorist acts. As
the most powerful group of Al Qaeda, the AQAP’s use of terror to reestablish legitimacy
arch and
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after the fall of Bin Laden proved to be particularly lethal. The AQAP’s actions provide
evidence for Abrahms’ theory that leadership removal increases violence by creating a
power struggle within the organization.242
Al Qaeda Terrorist Activity 2009-2014
Year

# of Attacks

Killed

Wounded

2009

65

352

492

2010

103

445

812

2011 (before)

28

395

359

2011 (after)

60

350

730

2012

522

1,919

3,447

2013

247

795

1,454

2014

315

935

885

Table 5
The change in the behavior of the AQAP is important because it shows the
importance of Bin Laden’s charismatic authority in holding the branches of Al Qaeda
together. Al Qaeda was Bin Laden’s organization and he provided the organization with a
sense of direction. The different branches used his legitimacy to enhance their own status
and power and, in exchange, they helped carry out Bin Laden’s plans. The problem with
this system was it put the authority of the core of Al Qaeda into one man, as opposed to the
office of the Amir. After Bin Laden was killed a new Amir was named and assumed the
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head of the organization. However, despite the best efforts of the organization, the new
Amir simply did not have the type of charismatic authority that Bin Laden had. This made
the center of Al Qaeda fairly useless to its different branches, so local leaders took the
materials and experience that the core leadership of Al Qaeda had provided them over the
years and used them to pursue their own goals.
The amount of authority that the core of Al Qaeda lost over the branches can be seen
in the center’s response to the AQAP change in direction after the death of Bin Laden. In
2012, the infighting within AQAP, as different local leaders scrambled for the most valuable
piece of Al Qaeda, was so bad that the core of Al Qaeda took the extraordinary measure of
pleading with the AQAP in open publications to stop fighting.243 A terrorist organization’s
existence is based on its ability to communicate covertly, and the fact that the core of Al
Qaeda was reduced to publicly begging one of its branches to listen to it shows how much
authority the center lost with the death of Bin Laden.
Just like the AQAP, Al Qaeda in Iraq also became more violent and regional after the
death of Bin Laden in order to re-establish it primacy. However, unlike the AQAP, Al Qaeda
in Iraq failed to compete with its regional rivals and has faded into obscurity. The group
has not launched a terrorist attack since 2013 despite the fact that 2012 was the group’s
most violent year (see table 6).244 The members and leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq did not
simply give up and go home, though. Instead, they gave up their association with Al Qaeda
to join a new terrorist group called the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The members

Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations, 2013 11-32
University of Maryland, “Global Terrorism Database,”
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=Al+Qaida+in+Iraq&sa.x=0&sa
.y=0&sa=Search
243
244

85

who tired to remain loyal to Al Qaeda found that, without the appeal of Bin Laden, they
simply could not compete with their newer regional rival.
Al Qaeda in Iraq
Year

# of Attacks

Killed

Wounded

2009

19

161

382

2010

33

163

623

2011 (before

3

158

245

27

153

401

2012

120

430

947

2013

77

347

814

2014

0

0

0

removal)
2011 (after
removal)

Table 6
While the most sophisticated and well equipped branches of Al Qaeda became more
lethal after the death of Bin Laden, some of the smaller branches that lacked much of the
critical infrastructure of AQAP and Al Qaeda in Iraq suffered a decrease in operational
capacity immediately following leadership removal. AQIM terrorist activity dropped
significantly after the removal of Bin Laden, with 2012 being its least active year. However,
by 2013, the organization’s rate of terrorist activity and lethality returned to around its
average (see Table 7).
The IJU also appears to have suffered from the loss of Bin Laden. While the Uzbek
group had always been a smaller branch of Al Qaeda, there was significant evidence that
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suggested that by 2010, the group was becoming more involved in the perpetration of
terrorist attacks planned by Al Qaeda’s core leadership. The organization started to receive
a large contingent of foreign fighters particularly from Germany, and even launched a failed
terrorist attack against the Ramstein Airforce Base in Germany.245 Since the removal of Bin
Laden, however, the organization has not been heavily involved with international
terrorism.
AQIM Terrorist Activity
Year

Attacks

Deaths

Wounded

2009

32

154

75

2010

17

41

74

2011 (before)

10

41

44

2011 (after)

9

6

13

2012

12

9

22

2013

18

48

50

2014

17

45

48

Table 7
The experiences of the more peripheral branches of Al Qaeda confirm the trends
seen in AQAP and Al Qaeda in Iraq. The removal of Bin Laden decayed the authority of Al
Qaeda’s core leadership and forced a return to regionalism in the branches of Al Qaeda.
However, unlike the stronger branch of Al Qaeda, the periphery branches experienced a
loss of capacity after the death of Bin Laden, since they had weak institutional structures
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and they were more negatively impacted by leadership removal than AQAP or Al Qaeda in
Iraq.
Given the mixed effects of the death of Bin Laden on the operational capacity of Al
Qaeda it is difficult to assess how effective leadership removal was as a counterterrorism
strategy. On the one hand, leadership removal did not lead to organizational collapse or the
halting of terrorist activities by Al Qaeda, as in the case of the PKK, and for citizens of
Yemen, the death of Bin Laden certainly left them worse off. On the other hand, it cannot be
said that the death of Bin Laden did not have an effect on Al Qaeda. The death of Bin Laden
fundamentally altered Al Qaeda. The core of the organization lost much of its authority over
its branches and has become significantly less relevant to the organization. The branches of
Al Qaeda that are left seem much less fixated on Bin Laden’s strategy of targeting the far
enemy. From the perspective of the American defense establishment, this could be a
counterterrorism win since the death of Bin Laden shifted the focus of the organization
away from targeting American citizens. However, the increased violence of the branches of
Al Qaeda poses a risk to the stability of the region and there is no guarantee that these
branches will not choose to adopt international terrorism as their main strategy later.
Additionally, some of the renegade branches of Al Qaeda spun off into regional terrorist
organizations that still gave the security establishment a headache.
While it is hard to weigh the cost and benefits of leadership removal, the case of Al
Qaeda does do a good job in illustrating how high levels of charismatic authority and
institutionalization interact within a terrorist organization. Once again, institutionalization
in an organization with a highly charismatic leader, served to expand the authority of the
charismatic leader instead of the office of the leader, over the organization. The highly
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institutionalized nature of Al Qaeda was simply a support mechanism to turn the will of
Osama Bin Laden into action. When Bin Laden was killed, the hierarchical Al Qaeda core
lost legitimacy. The organization that perpetrated the September 11th attacks died with Al
Qaeda. The organization that emerged after the death of Bin Laden took advantage of the
infrastructure that was in place to create new groups. High levels of institutionalization in
Al Qaeda did not allow the organization to survive leadership removal unchanged, but it
did allow the organization to keep its operational capacity and evolve into something new.
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Conclusion

In terrorist organizations with high levels of charismatic authority and
institutionalization, leadership removal does not degrade their operational capacity. The
institutional structures within the terrorist group ensure that leadership removal does not
result in organizational collapse, and the organization can continue to function. However,
the loss of charismatic authority within highly institutionalized terrorist organizations has
a significant impact on the goals and direction of a terrorist group. The loss of charismatic
authority from leadership removal threatens a terrorist group’s legitimacy forcing political
change within the organization and these changes can have positive counterterrorism
implications.
The positive impact of these changes is most clearly seen through the case of the
PKK. After the removal of Öcalan, the strategy that the PKK used to accomplish their
political goals changed overnight from one of insurgent violence with a heavy emphasis on
terrorist attacks to political negotiations with the Turkish state. The change in the PKK’s
tactics was immensely beneficial to the Turkish state as violent attacks by the PKK against
the Turkish state fell to essentially zero, relieving pressure on the Turkish government. As
noted in the chapter, though, even though the tactics of the PKK changed in a way that was
beneficial to the Turkish state, the potential of the organization to launch terrorist attacks
against the Turkish state was unhindered by leadership removal. After the breakdown of
political negotiations with the Turkish state, the PKK returned to the use of terrorism. To
this day, the PKK remains one of the Turkish state’s greatest threats. While leadership
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removal provided a chance at a political solution to the conflict between Turkey and the
PKK, it was not effective as a military strategy that could defeat the PKK.
Additionally, while leadership removal in highly charismatic and institutionalized
organizations can provide positive counterterrorism outcomes, it can also yield outcomes
that make the organization more dangerous. This was seen in the case of Al Qaeda, in which
the loss of Osama Bin Laden’s charismatic authority made some of the different regional
branches of Al Qaeda significantly more lethal as they attempted to reassert their
legitimacy in their respective regions. For the countries that had active Al Qaeda branches
operating within them, leadership removal was certainly a negative development. While
the removal of Osama Bin Laden could be argued as a positive development for the United
States, since it reduced the organization’s focus on fighting the far enemy, it also created
new headaches for the defense establishment since the more active Al Qaeda regional
branches threaten state stability across the Middle East. The United States’
counterterrorism policy had to adapt accordingly to this change in the nature of Al Qaeda.
After 2011, the number of U.S. drone attacks in Yemen rose drastically, as the U.S.
attempted to counter a more active AQAP.246 At best, the removal of Osama Bin Laden had a
mixed impact on the security of the United States.
Given that the effects of leadership removal in terrorist organizations with high
levels of charismatic authority and institutionalizations can be mixed, when should
governments pursue leadership removal against these organizations? Governments should
use and view leadership removal as a tool to modify the tactics and goals of terrorist
“Drone Strikes: Yemen.” New America. Accessed March 27, 2018.
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/americas-counterterrorism-wars/us-targetedkilling-program-yemen/
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organizations. Unfortunately for governments, how exactly leadership removal will modify
the goals and tactics of a terrorist organization depends heavily on intergroup dynamics
that are not usually transparent to governments. For example, one of the hopes of Israeli
military planners when they gave the order to assassinate Yassin was that Hamas might not
pursue suicide bombing as a strategy under a different leader.247 However, the dynamic
within Hamas empowered more radical leaders after the death of Yassin and suicide
bombings continued.
To understand how leadership removal impacts the goals of a terrorist organization,
it is important to understand the sources of legitimacy within that terrorist group. The
greatest strength of leadership removal is not it ability to degrade the operational capacity
of a terrorist organization but rather its ability to challenge the legitimacy of that
organization. To evaluate the impact of leadership removal it is essential to think about
how the organization will work to restore its legitimacy. The death of Osama Bin Laden
made the branches of Al Qaeda more violent within their regions to re-establish their
legitimacy. Öcalan was so successful at consolidating charismatic authority behind himself
through his hierarchical structure that even while captured by the Turkish state he
commanded enough authority within the PKK to demand that it declare a ceasefire and
start political negotiations. By looking to sources of legitimacy, the potential impacts of
leadership removal on an organization can be evaluated.

Evaluating Potential Effects of Leadership Removal on Contemporary Groups
How effective then would leadership removal be against a contemporary terrorist
organization such as ISIS? It would not be that effective. ISIS is not an organization that
247
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draws it legitimacy from its leader. Bagdadhi is a charismatic leader without a doubt, but
the true source of ISIS’ authority comes from its possession of territory, which justifies its
claim to be the new caliphate.248 Since ISIS is also a well-organized and institutionalized
organization, during its heyday it basically functioned as a state in the territory it
controlled, leadership removal could be resisted without an altering of the organization’s
goals or tactics.249 However, the U.S. policy of helping local forces reclaim territory from
ISIS poses a great challenge to the organization’s legitimacy, not to mention its operation
capacity as well, since unlike leadership removal, the reclaiming of territory was
accompanied by combat that resulted in substantial losses across all levels of ISIS’
organization. By the time of this writing, US coalition forces had reclaimed nearly all the
territory that ISIS once controlled. This development will force ISIS to turn to other sources
of legitimacy.
I predict that similar to the Al Qaeda case, the loss of the main source of legitimacy
will cause ISIS members to turn to regional terrorism. ISIS brought thousands of foreign
fighters to its caliphate to carry out attacks in Syria and Iraq.250 Now that the caliphate is
dead, these foreign fighters will most likely try to return to their home countries. Some of
these fighters will give up terrorist violence, but a few will use the skills they learned in
Syria and Iraq to conduct acts of terrorism in their home countries using ISIS’ name in a bid
to make the organization stay relevant. This is similar to how the branches of Al Qaeda
became more dangerous after the death of Osama Bin Laden. However, the main difference
between Al Qaeda and ISIS is that Al Qaeda already had a regional infrastructure in place
Gerges, Fawaz, ISIS: A History, (University of Princeton Press: 2016) 222-228.
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250 Ibid, 1-6.
248

249 Ibid,

93

that allowed the branches of Al Qaeda to operate effectively. ISIS has no regional
infrastructure in place so the new ISIS will be a decentralized, leaderless organization that
will carry out lone wolf style attacks in ISIS’ name. These attacks will probably be
significantly less lethal than the attacks that the organization undertook in Syria and Iraq
but could be more politically important in the counties where they occur.
The ISIS case illustrates how the logic used to evaluate the impacts of leadership
removal can be applied to other counterterrorism developments. Even though leadership
removal would not be effective against ISIS since the authority of the organization does not
come from its leader, thinking through the effects of challenging the legitimacy of ISIS
provides insights into how the organization will evolve from the U.S. effort to take its
territory.
With the massive caveat that a terrorist organization is not a state, the results of
leadership removal, particularly on highly charismatic and institutionalized terrorist
organizations, since they most closely resemble states, could be used to evaluate the
impacts using leadership removal on a head of state. This is particularly relevant since the
taboo on the use of leadership removal as a strategy in state conflict has recently
weakened. The South Korea government recently created a special decapitation unit,
whose sole function is to eliminate the North Korean leadership in event of a conflict
between the two states.251
The North Korean State is both highly institutionalized and utterly dependent on
charismatic authority so leadership removal would challenge the authority of the state and
Choe Sang-Hun “South Korea Plans ‘Decapitation Unit’ to Try to Scare North’s Leaders.”
The New York Times, September 12th, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/world/asia/north-south-korea-decapitation.html
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force changes in state behavior. However, I would never recommend leadership removal as
a solution to the Korean crisis because the chance that what happens as a result being far
worse than the status quo are unconscionably high. It is possible that after leadership
removal the new leader of North Korea adopts a more conciliatory tone toward South
Korea and is less committed to the North’s nuclear program, but it is far more likely that
local leaders decide the best way to increase their own legitimacy and power after
leadership removal is through massive and lethal retaliation against the South. Leadership
removal is simply too risky of a strategy to use against states, let alone nuclear-armed ones.

Areas for Further Research
One area not addressed within this thesis is the effect of capturing leaders instead of
killing them. With the caveat that I have not extensively researched the issue, I would
predict that it is always preferable to capture charismatic terrorist leaders as opposed to
killing them. This is because a captured terrorist leader poses a much bigger debacle to an
organization dependent on charismatic authority than a dead one. While a dead leader
forces the organization to re-establish its legitimacy through other means, a captured
leader will typically still hold authority within their organization and can use that authority
to modify the goals of the organization in a more controlled fashion. This is certainly what
Öcalan did after he was captured by the Turkish state. If Turkey had killed him instead of
capturing him it is unlikely that the PKK would have agreed to the cease-fire. The authority
that Öcalan has over his organization may be the reason that the Turkish state continues to
delay his execution. In addition to the two examples in this thesis, in which captured
leaders led to positive counterterrorism policy outcomes, the capture of Guzman of the
Shining Path and Auginaldo of the Philippines also led to their respective organizations’
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collapse. The effects of leadership removal are often messy and rarely controlled, but a
captured leader provides the opportunity to exert a little control over the process.

Final Thoughts
Leadership removal has been treated as a default strategy in counterterrorism for
far too long. It certainly has its place in the counterterrorism policy world as it is
remarkably effective against organizations with high levels of charismatic authority and
low levels of institutionalization, but its effects are far to varied to be applied as a blunt
instrument. Instead, leadership removal needs to looked at for what it is: a relatively
uncontrolled method through which states can alter the goals and tactics of terrorist
organizations. The employment of leadership removal should be limited and done on a
case-by-case basis, in which the internal dynamics of a terrorist organization are first
evaluated to determine that leadership removal can yield a positive outcome.
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Appendix
David Hoffman’s scale of Charismatic Authority252
1. Is the authority of the leader interpreted in terms of ingrained and traditional
conceptions of charismatic authority in the broader society and culture?
2. Is authority attributed to the leaders on the basis of the perception that there is an
impending or current crisis, one associated with the bankruptcy of existing forms of
traditional and/or rational-legal forms of authority?
3. Are attributions of power to the leader based on the follower’s perception of the
leader’s superhuman and/or exceptional powers and qualities?
4. Is the authority attributed to the leader associated with any physical impairment or
suffering viewed positively by the followers?
5. Does the leader legitimate their authority through reference to a higher source of
authority, either divine or some other transcendent source (i.e. a supreme
ideology)?
6. Are grandiose and exaggerated claims made about the nature and scope of the
leader’s authority and importance?
7. Are new members socialized into recognizing the special powers and authority of
the leader?
8. Does the leader figure prominently in the folklore of the group and the
representation of its “story”?
9. Are the organization’s decisions highly centralized and reliant on the will of the
leader?
252
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10. Is the leader intolerant of alternative sources of power and authority, both internal
and external to the group?
11. Does the leader introduce sudden and/or seemingly arbitrary changes in the
practices and policies of the group?
12. Do followers readily accept these sudden and/or seemingly arbitrary changes in the
practices and policies of the group?
13. Is the delegation of authority highly centralized and reliant on the will of the leader?
14. Does the legitimacy of subordinate leaders in the group depend on the nature of
their personal relationship with the leader?

Charismatic Authority of Shoko Asahara253
1. Yes. This criteria is easily fulfilled by Shoko Asahara. Shoko Asahara was
completely blind in one eye and partially blind in the other. He used disability to
substantiate his claim that his vision was not like that of ordinary men but divine in its
nature. This allowed him to see into the future and determine what the divine plan for the
world was and how his followers could achieve enlightenment. Members of Aum Shinrikyo
believed that Shoko Asahara occupied a higher dimensional existence, making him the solo
individual who could provide spiritual fulfillment.
2. Sort of. This might be the weakest aspect of Shoko Asahara’s charismatic
authority, but there are clear efforts on his part to ground his own charismatic authority in
more traditional conceptions of charismatic authority. For example, Shoko Asahara
barrowed heavily from Buddhist practices and even claimed he was the first enlightened
253
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one to be born on earth since Buddha himself. This practice allowed Shoko Asahara to
coopt the authority of Buddhism, which was very popular in Japanese culture to grant his
organization more legitimacy.
3. Yes. Shoko Asahara was brilliant at exploited disillusionment among individuals
to increase his own authority over his members. The time when Aum Shinrikyo
membership was most actively growing was also during an economic boom in Japan. While
this rapid economic growth brought many benefits to Japan, it also prompted vast cultural
change that left many young Japanese people disillusioned. The pressure of the economic
rat race and the rapid Westernization of Japan sent many young looking for spiritual
fulfillment. Shoko Asahara told them exactly what they wanted to hear; that they were right
to be disillusioned because Japanese society was morally bankrupt and this corrupt society
would soon collapse.
4. Yes. This criteria fits perfectly to Shoko Asahara. Again, Shoko Asahara was halfblind but he turned his disability into a key aspect of his cult-of-personality. This skill came
from an early start using his half-blindness to his advantage. As a child, he had been sent to
an all blind school, where his partial vision gave him an advantage over his peers and made
him a natural leader. He built his leadership skills as a child using his gift of limited vision
to manipulate his classmates.
5. Yes. As stated earlier, Shoko Asahara barrowed heavily from traditional Buddhist
practices creating an easy association between himself and the authority of Buddha.
6. Yes. The whole basis of Aum Shinrikyo was that Shoko Asahara was unique
among men and only he could successfully guide people to enlightenment. Many of the
claims made about Shoko Asahara such as the claim that he occupied a higher dimensional
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existence that allowed him to see into the future or the claim that on a trip to Nepal he was
personally entrusted with a secret mission from the Dalai Lama himself are clearly
exaggerated to stress his importance and authority.
7. Yes. Aum Shinrikyo had very bizarre socialization processes to get new members
to believe in the special powers and authority of Shoko Asahara. In one such ritual, recruits
would be placed on lightly vibrating mats and be given a tea that caused them to
hallucinate (it is suspected that the tea was laced with LSD). During these hallucinations
the recruits were told to think of Shoko Asahara because only through him could they avoid
bad visions and find the truth.
8. Yes. For Aum Shinrikyo, their story is completely dependent on Shoko Asahara.
Shoko Asahara was the only member of the organization to receive divine messages, so
only he could fulfill the organization’s goals. Shoko Asahara purposely designed the Aum
Shinrikyo founding myth with himself at the center.
9. Yes. Aum Shinrikyo was incredibly centralized. Shoko Asahara was the sole
individual responsible for the direction and decisions of the organization. Everything
produced by the organization was designed to increase Shoko Asahara ‘sauthority within it.
For example, all of Aum Shinrikyo’s advertising publications heavily featured Shoko
Asahara and his spiritual wisdom. The goal of the recruitment process was to attract people
who already felt close to Shoko Asahara as opposed to the organization at large.
10. Yes. Shoko Asahara always tried to eliminate opposing sources of authority both
within and outside of Aum Shinrikyo. The first targets of Aum Shinrikyo’s terrorist
activities were not ordinary citizens of Japan but fellow members of Aum Shinrikyo who
posed a challenge to Shoko Asahara’s authority. Once he had consolidated his authority

104

within Aum Shinrikyo, Shoko Asahara moved to eliminate his main rival in external
authority, the Japanese government. He first attempted to do this through elections, but
after the Aum Shinrikyo political party failed to win in parliamentary elections, Shoko
Asahara sought to undermine the authority of the Japanese government through terrorism.
11. Yes. Shoko Asahara quite frequently changed the religious practices of Aum
Shinrikyo. One of the largest and most dramatic changes he made to the organization was
the introduction of “poa”, which marked a transition of the religion towards violent
fanaticism.
12. Yes,.Despite Shoko Asahara’s frequent changes to the vision of Aum Shinrikyo,
the religion continued to grow and pick up new members. By the time of the Tokyo subway
attack, the group held over 40,000 members. The lack of an exodus from the organization
during major changes to its religious philosophy highlights just how strong Shoko
Asahara’s charismatic appeal in Aum Shinrikyo was.
13. Yes. All of the top positions of Aum Shinrikyo were filled by members who had
close personal relationships with Shoko Asahara and deeply believed in his divine nature.
Shoko Asahara was so effective in centralizing his authority that after he was captured, the
secondary leaders of Aum Shinrikyo found their authority over individual members of Aum
Shinrikyo deeply degraded. To counteract this, some secondary leaders isolated members
of Aum Shinrikyo from the news that Shoko Asahara had been arrested because they knew
if the rank and file found out they would lose their authority.
14. Yes. As said in criteria 13, all of the top leaders of Aum Shinrikyo held close
personal relationships with Shoko Asahara. This cemented Shoko Asahara’s authority at
the top of Aum Shinrikyo.
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Charismatic Authority of Ahmed Yassin254
1. Yes. Yassin drew heavily from traditional notions of Islamic authority to enhance his
own standing within Hamas.
2. Yes. The presence of Israel and the loss of Palestinian land was used as a
justification for Yassin’s authority.
3. Yes. Among the followers of Hamas there was a feeling that Yassin was unnaturally
wise.
4. Yes. Yassin was paralyzed from the waist down and had been since he was sixteen,
but he used this physical impairment to enhance his own cult-of-authority.
5. Yes. As mentioned earlier, Yassin drew heavily from the traditional authority of
Islam by living very piously and modestly.
6. Yes. He was given the title of the spiritual leader of Hamas and he was considered
essential to the organization.
7. No. Although Yassin was recognized as a leader of Hamas and beloved for his
spiritual wisdom, there was not a method through which individual recruits were
socialized to his authority.

Information for scale compiled from Matthew Levitt “Hamas: politics, charity, and
terrorism in the service of Jihad,” (Yale University Press: 2006), 34-37. And Khaled Hroub
“Hamas after Shaykh Yasin and Rantisi,” Journal of Palestinian Studies, Vol. 33 No. 4,
Summer 2004, 21-38.
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8. Yes. He did feature very proximately in the story of Hamas. However, he was not the
only figure to do so, and he did not attempt to rewrite the story of Hamas to just be
centered around himself.
9. No. Hamas is a networked organization and, at the local level, the authority of the
central leadership was significantly less important than the will and connections of
the local leader.
10. No. There was a wide variety of other sources of authority within Hamas that Yassin
tolerated. Even within the central leadership, Yassin competed with other leaders.
11. No, Although Hamas would change its positions on issues, decisions were reached
through consensus within the organization’s leadership rather than the arbitrary
will of one leader.
12. No.
13. No. Again the structure of Hamas was really focused on consensus building as
opposed to centralization.
14. No. It was more important for leaders to have a network within their community
than it was for them to have a strong personal relationship with the central
leadership.

Charismatic Authority of Abdullah Öcalan255
1. Yes. Öcalan’s authority was derived from Kurdish culture and he established his
organization to take advantage of these ideas.

Information for this scale compiled from Özlem Pusane “Turkey’s Military Victory over
the PKK and its Failure to End the PKK Insurgency.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 51, No. 5,
2015, 727-741.
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2. Yes. Öcalan’s organization effectively used the repression of the Kurdish people by
the Turkish government and the desire of the Kurdish people for a Kurdish state to
enhance his own authority.
3. Yes. Öcalan was not simply the leader of a liberation movement; he became the idea
of Kurdish liberation for many of the followers of the PKK. He was viewed as the
father of the modern Kurdish nation.
4. No.
5. Yes. Öcalan borrowed heavily from the ideas of nationhood and nationalism to
enhance his own authority within the PKK.
6. Yes. As mentioned earlier, Öcalan came to be viewed as the father of the Kurdish
nation and was viewed as a messiah figure.
7. Sort of. There was less of an emphasis on recognizing the special powers of Öcalan
but the PKK was very picky when it came to recruiting fighters. One of its criteria for
fighters was how deferential they were to authority.
8. Yes. Öcalan was not the sole founder of the PKK, but he fixed that by purging his
fellow co-founders and consolidating the group’s story behind him.
9. Yes. The organization of the PKK was incredibly centralized with all decisions
flowing from Öcalan down. Other leaders within the PKK were simply there to
execute the will of the leader.
10. Yes. Öcalan was incredibly intolerant of individuals within the PKK who threatened
his authority. He conducted frequent purges within the organization to ensure that
leaders could not establish their own following within the organization and his

108

purges were notorious for targeting even those who were close to him. He even
tried to have his own wife assassinated.
11. Yes. Although he wasn’t officially its leader at the time, his decision to switch tactics
to negotiating with the Turkish state after being captured illustrates how strong his
charismatic authority was within the organization.
12. Yes.
13. Yes. As stated earlier other leaders within the PKK were transactional, functioning
as tools to execute the will of Öcalan.
14. Yes. The other leaders within the PKK all relied on their personal relation with
Öcalan to gain their positions, and when that relationship deteriorated, they were
quickly purged.

Charismatic Authority of Osama Bin Laden256
1. Yes. Osama Bin Laden barrowed heavily from Islamic cultures and practices to
enhance his own charismatic authority. He was very conscious about presenting
himself as an excellent and devout Muslim.
2. Yes. The basis for Al Qaeda was that Middle Eastern regimes were secular and did
not represent the values of Islam. This dissatisfaction with traditional society led
individuals to Al Qaeda.
3. Yes. Osama Bin Laden had distinguished himself in the Soviet Afghan war as a
military commander. He quickly built up a myth about his leadership abilities.
256
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4. No. Unlike some charismatic leaders, Osama Bin Laden did not use a physical
disability as a means to enhance his charismatic authority.
5. Yes,.Osama Bin Laden frequently paid homage to traditional Islamic authority as a
way to enhance his own authority within Al Qaeda.
6. Yes. Osama Bin Laden was frequently claimed to be the only figure in the Arab world
who could defeat the West.
7. Sort of. There was less an emphasis on individual members being socialized but a
greater emphasis on existing organizations that were incorporated into Al Qaeda
recognizing the supreme authority of Osama Bin Laden.
8. Yes. Osama Bin Laden founded Al Qaeda with his own capital. He was essential to
the story of the group.
9. Yes. Osama Bin Laden was the ultimate authority within Al Qaeda. He dictated the
direction and goals of the organization to underlings who worked to fulfill his
wishes.
10. Yes. Although there were other leaders within Al Qaeda, they were all secondary to
Osama Bin Laden and decisions by other leaders always had to be justified in terms
of what Bin Laden wanted.
11. Yes. The switch of Al Qaeda from trying to overthrow Arab regimes to targeting
Western countries is a good example.
12. Yes. Osama Bin Laden effectively reorganized the priorities of Al Qaeda without
losing the faith of the members of the organization.
13. Yes. The organization of Al Qaeda was incredibly centralized and reliant on the
authority of Osama Bin Laden.
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14. Yes. All of the upper level leaders within Al Qaeda had close personal relationships
with Osama Bin Laden.

Criteria for High Levels of Institutionalization257
1. Do the structures in place in the organization reduce uncertainty during an external
shock?
2. How well known is the structure of the organization to its individual members?
3. How many resources does the organization have at its disposal?
4. Are there effective lines of secure communication within the organization?
5. Does the organization have access to external forms of legitimacy?
6. Does the organization have access to internal forms of legitimacy?
7. How effectively is the organization able to recruit members?
8. Is the organization able to maintain complex linkages between different actors?
9. How well integrated is the organization?
10. How strong is the motivation of individuals within the organization to work toward its
goals.

These criteria were inspired by Rene Bakker, Jörg Raab, and Brinton Milward, “A
preliminary theory of dark networks resilience.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,
Vol. 31, No. 1, Winter 2012, 33-62.
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